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Ernest E. Figart, Jr. *
T HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the sur-
vey period are found in judicial decisions and amendments to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.' This Article examines these develop-
ments and considers their impact on existing Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The most significant development in the area of jurisdiction over the
person was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson .2 The plaintiffs had purchased a new
automobile from a retail dealer in New York, and were injured when they
were involved in a collision in Oklahoma while on their way from New
York to Arizona. The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in Oklahoma on a
products liability theory against the manufacturer of the automobile, its
importer, its regional distributor, and its retail dealer. The retail dealer
and regional distributor, whose business was virtually confined to the east
coast, contested the assertion of personal jurisdiction. The trial court over-
ruled their objection, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, observ-
ing that the dealer and distributor could have foreseen the automobile's
"possible use in Oklahoma. '' 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
citing as a basis for its decision the absence of "affiliating circumstances"
that are a prerequisite "to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction."'4 While
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Meth-
odist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author acknowledges the very con-
siderable assistance of Coyt Randal Johnston, Storrow Moss Gordon, and Thomas A.
Graves, Attorneys at Law, in the preparation of this Article.
1. As a result of the amendments, 72 rules were modified, 22 new rules were added,
and 20 rules were repealed. These changes became effective Jan. 1, 1981. See Rules of Civil
Procedure-New Amendments, 43 TEx. B.J. 767 (1980). See generally Pope & McConnico,
Practicing Law with the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 456 (1980).
2. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
3. 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
4. 444 U.S. at 295. With respect to the lack of contacts between the dealer and distrib-
utor and the forum state, the Court noted that:
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales
and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges
and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through
salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State.
Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to
Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve
or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base
jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn
therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in
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conceding that due process limitations on state jurisdiction "have been
substantially relaxed over the years," 5 the Court reiterated that "the Due
Process Clause 'does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.' "6
Rejecting the "possible use" test enunciated by the Oklahoma appellate
court, the Supreme Court stated that "the foreseeability that is critical to
due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way in the forum State,"' 7 rather "it is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court there."8 Reaffirming the vitality of the "stream
of commerce" theory of personal jurisdiction,9 the Court specifically noted
that "[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the due process
clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased by consumers in the forum State."10
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute, article 2031 b, I continues to be
the subject of judicial measurement. Oswalt v. Scropto, Inc. ,12 a recent
Fifth Circuit decision, provides impetus to the "stream of commerce" the-
ory of personal jurisdiction in its application of World- Wide Volkswagen
to a case involving a defective cigarette lighter. The plaintiff claimed that
she had been seriously burned when a cigarette lighter that she had
purchased malfunctioned, and she brought suit in Texas against the dis-
tributor and the manufacturer of the lighter. The manufacturer, a Japa-
nese corporation, was served under article 2031 b, and it responded with a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court found
that although the manufacturer "'should have known or could expect the
product would reach the forum,' "3 the due process clause precluded the
assertion of jurisdiction because the manufacturer did not have "actual
knowledge" that the lighter would be marketed in Texas.14 The Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the fact that the manufacturer had reason to
know that the lighter would reach Texas was sufficient to meet the test of
World- Wide Volkswagen. 15 In upholding personal jurisdiction on this ba-
New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while pass-
ing through Oklahoma.
5. 444 U.S. at 292.
6. 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)).
7. Id at 297.
8. Id
9. See, e.g., Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973),
discussedin Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey ofTexas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 248, 249
(1974); Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1320 (5th Cir. 1970); Eyerly Aircraft
Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1969).
10. 444 U.S. at 297-98.
11. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981).
12. 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
13. Id at 198.
14. Id
15. Id. at 200. According to World- Wide Volkswagen, the requirements of due process
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sis, the court emphasized that the lack of actual knowledge on the part of
the manufacturer was irrelevant because no distinction should be drawn
with regard to whether the defendant "knew" or "should have known"
that the product would reach the forum.' 6
The case of Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co. 17 is significant
because it confirms the fact that the Texas Supreme Court has a more re-
strictive view of the federal due process requirements for nonresident serv-
ice than the federal courts. Because it is well-settled that article 2031b
reaches as far as the federal constitution will permit,' 8 any challenge to
service under the statute reduces to an inquiry into whether due process is
satisfied.' 9 During a previous survey period the Texas Supreme Court,
apparently overlooking federal authority that had sustained nonresident
service in analogous situations, 20 concluded in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc.
v. Burt2' that a defendant's contacts with Texas did not satisfy federal con-
stitutional requirements and, therefore, affirmed the trial court's dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction. 22 Questioning U-Anchor's interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment and returning the focus of inquiry to federal
authority, the Fifth Circuit in Southwest Offset concluded that federal
courts need not be bound by state court interpretations of constitutional
requirements. 23
Section 3 of article 2031 b authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident when he is "doing business" in Texas.24 "Doing business," as
defined by section 4, includes entering into a contract by mail or otherwise
with "a resident of Texas" to be performed by either party in whole or in
are satisfied in a products liability case when the defendant causes its goods to enter the
stream of commerce "with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum State." World-Wide Volkswagen, Inc. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
16. 616 F.2d at 200.
17. 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
18. See, e.g., U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Michigan Gen. Corp. v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, Inc., 582 S.W.2d
594, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. See Southern Nat'l Bank v. Tri Financial Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173, 1191 (S.D. Tex.
1970), mod!fiedon other grounds sub nom. Southern Nat'l Bank v. Crateo, Inc., 458 F.2d 688
(5th Cir. 1972). The district court stated that "[tjhis test ... reduces to due process, for the
long arm of Texas has as great a reach as due process permits." 317 F. Supp. at 1191.
20. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Product Promotions,
Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
21. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
22. 553 S.W.2d at 761. The plaintiff, a Texas advertising firm, brought suit in Texas
against an Oklahoma resident to collect sums due under a written contract. Service was
effected by means of TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980-
1981). The contract was solicited in Oklahoma by the plaintiff and was executed by both
parties in that state. With respect to performance, the contract required the plaintiff to erect
advertising displays in Oklahoma and obligated the defendant to send payment to the plain-
tiff's offices in Texas. The defendant mailed checks to Texas, but had no other contacts with
the state. On the basis of these facts, the court concluded that the defendant's contacts with
Texas did not satisfy federal constitutional requirements, and affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal for lack of personal jurisdiction. 553 S.W.2d at 764; see Figari, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 407, 408-09 (1978).
23. 622 F.2d at 152; accord, Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1219-20
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (memorandum decision).
24. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 3 (Vernon 1964).
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part in this state. 25 The reference to "a resident of Texas" has posed a
problem for the nonresident plaintiff seeking to effect service upon a non-
resident defendant in a Texas court under article 2031 b. The question
arises whether the residency requirement excludes from the definition of
"doing business" one nonresident's contractual relations with another non-
resident even though the contract is to be performed in Texas. This ques-
tion was answered in the negative by the court of civil appeals in Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Lummis.26 Relying on U-Anchor,27 the Rosemont court
concluded that "if the transaction at issue meets the constitutional require-
ment of due process a suit thereon is justiciable in Texas even though
neither party is a resident of the state."'28
Two recent federal cases, Dotson v. Fluor Corp. 29 and KL Cattle Co. v.
Bunker,30 also are instructive in the interpretation of the Texas long-arm
statute. Because article 203 lb recently was amended to expand the defini-
tion of "doing business,"'3 ' the court in Dotson considered the question of
whether the amendment could be given retroactive application. Conclud-
ing that such a construction was permissible under the Texas Constitution
because the amendment was remedial and procedural and did not affect
any vested rights of the defendant, the court sustained personal jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the expanded definition. 32 In KL Cattle Co. a foreign
executrix challenged the plaintiffs attempted service on her under article
2031b. Noting that if the decedent were still alive, jurisdiction over his
person would have been proper, the court turned to the question of
whether the decedent's contacts with the forum could be imputed to the
representative of his estate. 33 Based on its review of existing authorities,
the court concluded that jurisdiction over a nonresident personal represen-
tative may not properly be asserted when service on a nonresident executor
or administrator is not expressly provided for in the long-arm statute.34
Finding no reference to personal representatives in article 2031 b, the court
ruled in favor of the foreign executrix. 35
The Texas Supreme Court concluded during an earlier survey period
25. Id § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
26. 596 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
27. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
28. 596 S.W.2d at 920; see National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Syss., Inc., 480 S.W.2d
455, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. 492 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
30. 491 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
31. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). See gen-
eraly Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 415, 418
(1980).
32. 492 F. Supp. at 315. Two earlier cases held that a statute authorizing substituted
service could be applied retroactively. See Muchard v. Berenson, 307 F.2d 368, 370 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963); Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp.,
185 F. Supp. 48, 51-52 (S.D. Tex. 1960), rev'don other grounds, 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961).
But see Rozell v. Kaye, 201 F. Supp. 377, 379 (S.D. Tex. 1962); Rozell v. Kaye, 197 F. Supp.
733, 735 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
33. 491 F. Supp. at 1315-16.




that service under article 2031 b is not completed until process is forwarded
by the designated state official to the nonresident defendant and, in order
to establish the jurisdiction of the trial court over the defendant's person,
the record must affirmatively show that the process was forwarded. 36
Faced with an attempt by a plaintiff to cure such a defect retroactively, the
court in Cars & Concepts, Inc. v. Funston 37 concluded that the required
showing must appear of record before a default judgment is rendered.
Thus, the court held that curing an omission after a default judgment, even
while the judgment remains interlocutory, will not suffice. 38
One final development in the area of personal jurisdiction should be of
interest to the trial attorney. Meineke Discount Muffer Shops, Inc. v. Feld-
man,39 a recent decision by a federal district court, holds that a party may
contract in advance to submit to in personam jurisdiction in a Texas court,
and that the contract will be enforced in this state.40
II. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Rule 120a, which governs special appearances to challenge personal ju-
risdiction in state court, requires that such an appearance "shall be made
by sworn motion" filed prior to any other pleading or motion.41 As origi-
nally adopted, rule 120a contained no provision allowing an amendment
of the special appearance motion to correct a deficiency.42 As a result, the
filing of an unsworn motion constituted a general appearance and sub-
jected the movant to the jurisdiction of the court for all purposes. 43 The
amended version of rule 120a, however, permits amendment of a special
appearance motion in order to cure a defect. 44 Focusing on this aspect of
the rule, Stegall & Stegall v. Cohn,45 following an earlier case, 46 held that
rule 120a permits an amendment to verify the motion.47 Because rule 120a
authorizes a defendant to make a special appearance for the limited pur-
36. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973). The required show-
ing is usually made by filing a certificate of mailing issued by the Texas secretary of state.
See Figari, supra note 9, at 248 n.7.
37. 601 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
38. Id at 803.
39. 480 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (memorandum decision).
40. Id at 1309; cf. Monesson v. National Equip. Rental, Ltd., 594 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (judgment obtained in New York on basis of prior
contractual consent by defendant to personal jurisdiction held enforceable).
41. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
42. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a (1966).
43. Stewart v. Walton Enterprises, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Austin Rankin Corp. v. Cadillac Pool Corp., 421 S.W.2d 733, 734
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, no writ).
44. TEX. R. CIrv. P. 120a. See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 293, 294 (1976).
45. 592 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
46. Dennett v. First Continental Inv. Corp., 559 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1977, no writ); f Duncan v. Denton County, 133 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1939, writ dism'd) (amendment of unsworn controverting affidavit to add verification
permitted).
47. 592 S.W.2d at 429.
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pose of questioning whether he is "amenable to process,' 48 two cases dur-
ing the survey period concluded that such a motion cannot be used to raise
the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.49
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Rule 106,50 which governs service of process in state court, directs that
service is to be effected by the designated officer upon the defendant either
by personal delivery or by mailing the process in a prescribed manner to
the defendant. Furthermore, when securing service by these preferred
methods is impractical, rule 106 authorizes the trial court, upon motion, to
order substituted service upon the defendant by one of several acceptable
methods.5' Interpreting an earlier version of rule 106 strictly, the court in
Harrison v. Dallas Court Reporting College, Inc.,52 addressed the impracti-
cality requirement and concluded that a plaintiff seeking to secure an or-
der permitting substituted service must offer proof that both of the
preferred methods are impractical before substituted service can be au-
thorized.53 As an apparent attempt to reduce the impracticalities flowing
from the holding in Harrison, rule 106 was recently amended to authorize
substituted service where the plaintiff establishes that service by either of
the two preferred methods has been attempted unsuccessfully.
54
The failure of former rule 106 to delineate the proof requirements of a
motion seeking substituted service posed a serious dilemma for plaintiffs.
55
Addressing this problem, amended rule 106 specifies that a motion for sub-
stituted service be "supported by affidavit stating the location of the de-
fendant's usual place of business or usual place of abode or other place
where the defendant can probably be found" and "the facts" showing that
service has been attempted under one of the preferred methods "at the
location named in such affidavit but has not been successful."
56
The cases of Hurd v. D.E Goldsmith Chemical Metal Corp. 57 and Ex
parte Wood 58 clarify two issues in the area of substituted service. In Hurd
a substituted service authorized by the trial court to be made at the defend-
48. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
49. Estate of Griffin v. Sumner, 604 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1980, no writ); Oliver v. Boutwell, 601 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no
writ).
50. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106.
51. Id The 1980 amendment to rule 106 decreased the number of acceptable methods
of substituted service. Compare id with Tex. R. Civ. P. 106 (1978).
52. 589 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
53. Id at 815-16.
54. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106; see Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 486-87.
55. See Harrison v. Dallas Court Reporting College, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ) (motion supported by affidavit failing to detail number
and times of attempts at personal service held insufficient); Kirkegaard v. First City Nat'l
Bank, 486 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, no writ) (motion unsupported by
officer's affidavit held insufficient).
56. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(b).
57. 600 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
58. 590 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
[Vol. 35
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ant's usual place of business was invalidated because the serving officer's
return omitted to state that the address at which process was left was the
usual place of business of the defendant. 59 The court in Hurd found it
insufficient for the return to state only that a copy of the citation and peti-
tion were left at a certain address without including the statement that the
address is the defendant's usual place of business.60 The court in Wood
focused on the portion of rule 106 that permits the trial court to authorize
service to be made "by any disinterested adult named by the court in its
order" where service by an officer is impractical, 6' and invalidated a sub-
stituted service because the order authorizing such service did not identify
the adult by name.62
Previously, service of process upon a defendant could be made only by
the sheriff or constable of the county in which the defendant was located.63
With the goal of expediting the effectuation of service, 64 rule 103 has been
amended to permit also service by mail to be made by the sheriff or consta-
ble of the county in which the case is pending, regardless of the defend-
ant's location. 65 Moreover, amended rule 103 now permits service by
registered or certified mail and citation by publication to be made by the
clerk of the court in which the case is pending.66
IV. VENUE
The venue provisions of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices--Con-
sumer Protection Act 67 continued to be the subject of judicial scrutiny dur-
ing the survey period. In Legal Security Life Insurance Co. v. Trevino68 the
Texas Supreme Court resolved a conflict within the courts of civil ap-
peals69 as to the scope of the 1977 version of the Act that authorized suits
in counties in which the defendant "has done business."'70 Adopting a
broad view, the court held that "[a] defendant 'has done business' where
59. 600 S.W.2d at 346-47.
60. Id.
61. Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(e) (1978).
62. 590 S.W.2d at 569.
63. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 103 (1978).
64. See Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 485-86.
65. TEX. R. Civ. P. 103; see Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 486.
66. TEX. R. Civ. P. 103; see Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 486.
67. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
68. 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980).
69. Compare Legal Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Trevino, 594 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1979), af'd, 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980) with Commercial Equip. Leasing Co. v.
Steve's Oil Field Servs. Inc., 601 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ);
Davis v. Aguila, Inc., 600 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ); Carter
v. Suniland Furniture Co., 596 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ); Frost
v. Molina, 595 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd); and Moore
v. White, 587 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ). See also Figari, supra
note 31, at 421.
70. Tex. Gen. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 8, at 604, discussed in Figari, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 455, 462-63 (1979). That provision of the Act was
amended in 1979 to delete the "doing business" provision. Tex. Gen. Laws 1979, ch. 603,
§ 7, at 1332. See Figari, supra note 31, at 421.
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the venue fact proved is the single transaction which is the basis of the
suit."'7 1 In United Plastics Co. v. Dyes72 the court further eased a plaintiffs
burden by following a line of cases73 that held that a plaintiff need not
prove a cause of action under the Act to maintain venue, but merely allege
one.
74
In contrast, the court in Martin v. Commercial National Bank75 narrowly
construed the language of subdivision 5(b) of article 1995.76 Under that
subdivision, a suit brought "upon or by reason of" a loan "intended prima-
rily for personal, family, household or agricultural use" may be brought
either in the county where the defendant resides or where the defendant
signed the contract. 77 Although the original loan to the defendant in Mar-
tin was made for the purpose of purchasing goats, the court held that sub-
division 5(b) was inapplicable because the note sued upon was a renewal
note extending the original loan period. 78 According to the court, the pur-
pose of the renewal note was "to extend the time for payment" and there-
fore the note was not a loan intended primarily for agricultural purposes. 79
Subdivision 31 of article 1995, which governs venue in "[s]uits for
breach of warranty by a manufacturer of consumer goods,"80 was also the
subject of a narrow judicial construction during the survey period. The
court in Gorman-Rupp Corp. v. Kirk8 held that an industrial water pump
was not a "consumer good" within the meaning of the statute,8 2 and in so
doing, rejected the reasoning of those courts that had interpreted the term
more broadly.83 Instead, the court relied upon "the rule requiring the
venue statute to be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. '84
Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. Sames85 presented the novel question of
71. 605 S.W.2d at 857.
72. 588 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
73. See Pettit v. England, 583 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ);
Compu-Center, Inc. v. Compubill, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.]
1979, no writ); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1979, no writ), discussed in Figari, supra note 31, at 420-21.
74. 588 S.W.2d at 860. Although the court decided the case under the 1977 venue pro-
visions, the subsequent amendments of the Act did not alter the language of the statute upon
which the court relied in reaching its decision.
75. 598 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
76. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
77. Id
78. Id
79. 598 S.W.2d at 35. Accordingly, the court did not reach the question of whether the
original loan for the purchase of goats was one intended for agricultural purposes. Id n. 1.
80. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(31) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
81. 601 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
82. Id at 51.
83. See Trucker's Equip., Inc. v. Sandoval, 569 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1978, no writ); Maintenance & Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd). See Figari, supra note 31, at 422.
84. 601 S.W.2d at 51; accord, Chavez v. Murrel's Welding Works, 585 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ); L & M-Surco Mfg., Inc. v. Winn Tile Co., 580
S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ.dism'd). The court in Kirk, however, made
no attempt to articulate a comprehensive definition of "consumer goods."
85. 598 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1980); see Note, Application of the Texas Venue Statute to
Strict Liability in Tort.: Lubbock Manufacturing Company v. Sames, 34 Sw. L.J. 1004 (1980).
[Vol. 35
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whether the sole fact that a fatal accident occurred in the county of suit is
sufficient to maintain venue under subdivision 23 of article 199586 in a
strict liability action against the manufacturer. The Texas Supreme Court
analyzed the elements of a cause of action for strict liability in tort and
found that physical harm to person or property was essential. 87 Thus, the
court found that the cause of action arose in part in the county where the
harm, ie., the accident, occurred within the meaning of subdivision 23,
and ruled that venue was proper in that county.8
Article 1995 contains two separate subdivisions dealing with the venue
of suits against corporations: subdivision 23 governing suits against do-
mestic corporations and subdivision 27 governing suits against foreign cor-
porations. 89 During the survey period two courts of civil appeals
considered cases in which foreign corporations argued that certificates of
authority obtained pursuant to the Texas Business Corporation Act90 con-
ferred upon them domestic corporation status for venue purposes. 9' In
both instances the courts rejected the defendants' arguments and, in so
doing, expressly disapproved the reasoning and result of a prior court of
civil appeals decision.92
The elements of proof necessary to establish venue in usury suits were
clarified by the Texas Supreme Court in Fitting Supply Co. v. Bell County
Solar Control Corp. 93 Resolving a conflict among the courts of civil ap-
peals,94 the court in Fitting Supply held that the venue provisions of the
86. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(23) (Vernon 1964) provides for venue against
a corporation in the county in which "the cause of action or part thereof arose."
87. 598 S.W.2d at 237. In reaching this result, the court relied upon the elements delin-
eated by the Restatement of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965).
598 S.W.2d at 236.
88. 598 S.W.2d at 237. The court distinguished the situation in which breach of a con-
tract alone is sufficient to give rise to a cause of action for at least nominal damages, without
the necessity to prove actual damages. Id at 236-37; see, e.g., Stone Fort Nat'l Bank v.
Forbess, 126 Tex. 568, 91 S.W.2d 674 (1936).
89. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts.,1996(23), (27) (Vernon 1964).
90. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon 1980) provides that a foreign corpora-
tion that has obtained a certificate of authority "enjoy[s] the same, but no greater, rights and
privileges as a domestic corporation."
91. Sumitomo Corp. of America v. James K. Anderson, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Moore, 596 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, no writ). The defendants' arguments in this regard were predicated on
the fact that subdivision 27 authorizes a wider range of venue and imposes a lighter burden
of proof on a plaintiff than does subdivision 23. See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 265, 268 (1975).
92. Sumitomo Corp. of America v. James K. Anderson, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); see Burrows v. Texas Kenworth Co., 554 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ dism'd). The court in Sumitomo distinguished the holding in
Burrows from that in J.I. Case Co. v. Darcy, 424 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1968, writ dism'd), which had held that a foreign corporation that has obtained a certificate
becomes a resident of Texas for purposes of venue determinations under TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1995(3) (Vernon 1964). 599 S.W.2d at 118.
93. 605 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. 1980).
94. Compare Bell County Solar Control Corp. v. Fitting Supply Co., 593 S.W.2d 118
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979), rev'd, 605 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. 1980) with Hugh Robinson Farm
Mach., Inc. v. Wied, 593 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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usury statute95 require a plaintiff to allege and prove not only that he re-
sides in the county of suit, but also that he has a meritorious cause of
action.96
Venue of a suit brought against a national bank is governed by a federal
statute requiring that such actions be brought in the county of the bank's
domicile. 97 Exceptions to the statute do exist, however,98 and two courts
during the survey period construed those exceptions. In Stephenson v.
Walker99 the plaintiff brought suit against a national bank for the specific
performance of a contract to convey Texas real estate. Attempting to over-
come the bank's assertion of the statutory venue privilege, the plaintiff first
argued that the action was local rather than transitory, and therefore was
not within the terms of the statute. Although the court recognized that a
purely local action is not subject to the statutory requirements, 00 it held
that a suit for specific performance or damages arising out of a contract to
convey realty is not of a purely local character.' 0 ' The court also rejected
the plaintiffs second argument: that the bank had waived its venue privi-
lege by seeking a protective order to limit the scope of a deposition after
appearing specially pursuant to rule 120a.102 Noting that the motion for
protective order was solely for the purpose of limiting the scope of the
deposition to issues relevant to the venue objection, the court held that
such conduct did not constitute the intentional relinquishment of the privi-
lege necessary for waiver.103
The plaintiff in West v. City National Bank 104 was more successful in
establishing waiver. In West the national bank first filed a general denial
in answer to the plaintiffs petition, then filed a special appearance pursu-
ant to rule 120a, 0 5 and finally filed an amended special appearance and a
motion to dismiss for improper venue. The court first noted that an at-
95. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1971).
96. 605 S.W.2d at 856. The plaintiff's failure to prove that usurious interest was paid
therefore was fatal to his attempt to maintain venue in the county of his residence. Id
97. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976). See generally Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.
555 (1963).
98. See, e.g., Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tripp, 516 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1974) (unlawful garnishment held waiver of privilege), vacated as moot,
18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 278 (Apr. 12, 1975), discussed in Figari, supra note 44, at 296. But see
First Nat'l Bank v. Stoutco, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ
dism'd) (intentional relinquishment of known right necessary to constitute waiver), discussed
in Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 373, 376 (1977).
99. 593 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
100. Id. at 848; accord, Houston Nat'l Bank v. Farris, 549 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1977, writ dism'd), discussed in Figari, supra note 22, at 412; South Padre Dev. Co. v.
Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 538 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976,
no writ), discussed in Figari, supra note 98, at 376.
101. 593 S.W.2d at 849. In determining what is a local action, the court in Stephenson
relied upon decisions interpreting the scope of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(14)
(Vernon 1964). 593 S.W.2d at 849.
102. TEX. R. Crv. P. 120a.
103. 593 S.W.2d at 849.
104. 597 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
105. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a.
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tempt to assert the provisions of the National Bank Act' 06 in a plea of
privilege under rule 86107 was improper, because the plea of privilege is
proper only to transfer a case from one Texas county to another. 0 8 That
issue aside, the court held that the bank's failure to file its special appear-
ance before the general denial constituted a waiver of its venue privi-
lege.' 0 9
Section 2(g) of the Texas comparative negligence statute provides that
"[a]ll claims for contribution between named defendants in the primary
suit shall be determined in the primary suit." '" 0 During the survey period
two courts came to different conclusions concerning the meaning of "pri-
mary suit" where only one defendant successfully asserts a plea of privi-
lege. In Gonzales v. Blake"' only one of the three defendants in a suit
brought in Harris County filed a plea of privilege to be sued in Hidalgo
County; subsequently a cross-claim for contribution was filed by the other
two defendants against him. Although the court found that the plea of
privilege should have been sustained as to the original plaintiffs claims
against that defendant, it nevertheless held that section 2(g) 1 2 requires
that the cross-claims against him be determined in Harris County." 13 The
court reasoned:
Since in this case the claim for contribution . . . cannot be deter-
mined until the liability of [the cross-claimants] to answer in damages
to the [plaintiff] has been determined, the primary suit must be con-
sidered to be the one in which such a judgment can be rendered.
Therefore, the primary suit in this case is pending in Harris County,
Texas. " 4
In Blair v. Thomas," 5 however, the court concluded that there is no "pri-
mary suit" once the plea of privilege is sustained as to one defendant." 16
According to the court:
He is then no longer a party to the original action against other de-
fendants. . . . So far as he is concerned, the primary suit has been
transferred to the county of his residence, and any third-party action
against him by other defendants claiming contribution is subject to his
right to have such action transferred to the county of his resi-
dence ...
• * * After such a severance, the posture of each action is the same
as if only one defendant had been sued. In that situation, a third-
party action for contribution is not a claim "for contribution between
named defendants," and, consequently, venue of the third-party ac-
106. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976).
107. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86.
108. 597 S.W.2d at 464.
109. Id
110. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
111. 605 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
112. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
113. 605 S.W.2d at 638.
114. Id. at 637.
115. 604 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
116. (d at 471.
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tion is not governed by article 2212a.1 7
Venue of ancillary claims was also considered in United Coin Meter Co.
v. FM. Short Co. , 118 a case addressing venue of counterclaims closely re-
lated to the claims asserted in the original suit.'1 9 In United Coin Meter
the plaintiff sued the defendant for repudiating a contract and the defend-
ant successfully asserted a plea of privilege. The defendant then counter-
claimed for breach of nine other contracts between the parties, whereupon
the plaintiff filed a plea of privilege. Because each of the contracts were
identical and the suit depended on construction of the contractual terms,
the court held that the plaintiff's plea was properly denied.' 20
Failure to allege a county of residence was held fatal to a defendant
foreign corporation's plea of privilege in O.F Mossberg & Sons v. Sulli-
van,121 under the rationale that the venue privilege extends only to those
who qualify as inhabitants of Texas.' 22 The defendant in that case had
specifically alleged that it had no agent, representative, or office in Texas.
Because for venue purposes a foreign corporation is a resident of Texas
only where it maintains an office and conducts business, 123 the court held
-that the plea of privilege failed to meet the rule 86124 requirement that the
plea specifically state the county of the defendant's residence. 25
Despite a defendant's proper assertion of a plea of privilege in due order
of pleading, his subsequent conduct may result in a waiver of the plea. 26
In Cope Construction Co. v. Power 127 the court held that waiver occurred
when the defendants, without reserving their venue rights, participated in a
hearing on a motion to consolidate with another suit pending in the same
county before the hearing on the plea of privilege was held. ' 28 In contrast,
no waiver was found in Perkola v. Koelling & Associates, Inc. ,129 in which
the defendants filed special exceptions after filing the plea of privilege, but
did not present the exceptions for ruling before the plea of privilege hear-
ing. The court in Perkola also rejected. the plaintiffs argument that the
defendants' participation in a temporary injunction hearing waived the
plea of privilege, finding that the defendant's appearance at the hearing
was only with respect to an ancillary matter,130 and not an appearance in
117. Id (citations omitted) (quoting Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Martin Equip. Co.,
593 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ)).
118. 585 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. See generally Figari, supra note 91, at 267-68.
120. 585 S.W.2d at 916. The fact that the defendant had the case transferred to his
county of residence prior to filing the counterclaim was held to be irrelevant. Id
121. 591 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
122. See I R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 4.03.2 (rev. ed. 1965).
123. 591 S.W.2d at 955-56.
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86.
125. 591 S.W.2d at 957.
126. See Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 182,
184-85 (1973).
127. 590 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
128. Id at 722-23.
129. 601 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ dism'd).
130. In so finding, the court noted that the temporary injunction hearing did not resolve
any issues of fact or law in the main suit. Id at 112.
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the main suit. 13 1
V. PLEADINGS
Two significant changes were made in the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to strengthen the power of the trial court to deal with violations of the
pleading rules. Rule 70, as amended,132 enlarges the sanctions that may be
imposed on a party who files a pleading that takes the opposite party by
surprise. 33 The rule authorizes the trial court to assess the reasonable ex-
penses of the surprised party, including attorneys' fees, that he might incur
in the course of a resulting continuance, or to enter "such other order with
respect thereto as may be just."'1 34 Amended rule 73135 enlarges the sanc-
tions that may be imposed upon a party failing to furnish a copy of his
pleadings to the adverse party. The trial court is now authorized to strike
all or part of the pleadings, to direct that the party not be permitted to
present grounds contained in such pleadings, to require the party guilty of
the failure to reimburse the adverse party for reasonable expenses, includ-
ing attorneys' fees, incurred as a result of such failure, and to "make such
order with respect to the failure as may be just."'1 36
Consistent with amendments to other rules making the date of the sign-
ing of a judgment the operative act,' 37 rule 90138 has been modified to
require that defects in pleadings in a nonjury case be pointed out by writ-
ten exception prior to the signing of the judgment in order to avoid waiver
of objection. Furthermore, by deleting the words "motion or" in the for-
mer version of the rule, amended rule 90 suggests that defects in pleadings
must be pointed out by exception and not by motion.
Four cases decided during the survey period considered the sufficiency
of a denial of a sworn account under rule 185.139 Rule 185 provides that a
suit on sworn account "shall be taken as prima facie evidence thereof, un-
less the party resisting such claim shall . . . file a written denial, under
oath, stating [1] that each and every item is not just or true, or [2] that some
specified item or items are not just and true."' 140 In Crystal Investments v.
Manges' 4 1 the defendant filed a supplemental answer that stated: "Your
Defendant denies that he owed the Plaintiff the sums sued upon in his
131. Id The court further held that the defendant's attorney's agreement to accept serv-
ice of process was not a waiver. Id
132. TEx. R. Cv. P. 70.
133. Rule 70 previously authorized the court only to impose the cost of the term upon,
and charge the continuance of the cause to, the party filing a pleading that takes the opposite
party by surprise. Tex. R. Civ. P. 70 (1978).
134. TEx. R. Crv. P. 70.
135. TEx. R. Crv. P. 73. Rule 73 previously authorized a party not furnished with a copy
of a pleading to secure a copy from the clerk and charge all costs therefor to the party who
failed to deliver a copy to all adverse parties. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 73 (1978).
136. Tnx. R. Civ. P. 73.
137. See notes 373-75 infra and accompanying text.
138. TEx. R. Civ. P. 90.
139. TEx. R. Civ. P. 185.
140. Id
141. 596 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1980).
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petition, or any part thereof, and that the said amount is not just and true
in whole or in part . . " .142 Focusing on this language, the supreme
court held that, because the answer did not deny the validity of all items or
any specific item contained in the sworn account, the answer was no more
than a general denial and failed to satisfy the requirements of rule 185.143
Similarly, in Gayne v. Dual-Air, Inc. 144 the court of civil appeals held that
the defendant failed to satisfy rule 185 because his verification of the deni-
als contained in his answer was made "to the best of his knowledge."145
Reiterating the rule that courts should be "extremely exacting in the nature
of the language used in sworn denials of such accounts,"' 146 the court held
that the language "best of his knowledge" was equivocal and inadequate
to satisfy rule 185.147
A more liberal view of the requirements of rule 185 is found in Hill v.
Floating Decks of America, Inc. ,148 where the court held that the defend-
ant's answer, which recited that "each and every item in Plaintiffs petition
which is the foundation of Plaintiff's action is not just or true," was in
compliance with rule 185.149 In so finding, the court rejected the argu-
ments that it was defective because it failed to recite that the denial was
upon personal knowledge and that it included the words "in Plaintiffs pe-
tition which is the foundation of Plaintiffs action,"' 50 language that is not
called for in rule 185.151
The advisability of using terms of ordinary meaning to allege the exist-
ence of a sworn account was pointed out in Coon v. Pettiohn & Pettiohn
Plumbing, Inc. ,152 wherein the plaintiffs technical description of the ac-
count resulted in a reversal of his judgment. The plaintiff, a plumbing
contractor, alleged monies due on specific dates for a "Bid," for an
"Amount due rough in," and for an "Amount due top out."'15 3 The court
held that the descriptions of the items furnished on account did not satisfy
the requirements of rule 185, because they did not describe with reason-
able certainty the nature of the items making up the account. 154 While the
court observed that the descriptions might have meaning to the parties or
142. Id at 854.
143. Id
144. 600 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
145. Id at 374-75.
146. Id at 375 (quoting Solar v. Petersson, 481 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ)).
147. 600 S.W.2d at 375. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished the language
"within my knowledge" and approved of its use as being an acceptable variation of the
language of the rule itself. Id
148. 590 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
149. Id. at 724, 729.
150. Id.
151. The more liberal approach of the court in Hill must be viewed with some caution by
the trial practitioner, as it is somewhat inconsistent with other decisions. See, e.g., Crystal
Invs. v. Manges, 596 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1980); Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ).
152. 587 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).




to the plumbing trade, it nevertheless held them to be legally insufficient
because their meaning could not be determined without additional evi-
dence. 155
VI. LIMITATIONS
Article 55390 56 extends the limitations period up to an additional thirty
days beyond the answer date on a counterclaim or crossclaim that would
otherwise be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, provided that
such claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence upon which the
plaintiff's suit is based. In North American Land Corp. v. Boutte 157 the
court applied article 5539c to allow the assertion of a counterclaim that the
defendant previously had filed as a plaintiff in a separate lawsuit that was
dismissed for want of prosecution. 158 In reaching its holding, the court
distinguished Hobbs Trailers v. J.T Arnett Grain Co. ,159 in which the
supreme court refused to accord the saving effect of article 5539c to the
claims of a plaintiff who became a nominal defendant through a realign-
ment of the parties.160
During the survey period a decision of significance to practitioners was
handed down in Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc. 161 The plaintiff in Gar-
cia had been injured during the course of his employment by a product his
employer had purchased from the manufacturer; however, he failed to file
suit against the manufacturer until over three years later. By framing his
cause of action as a suit for breach of an implied warranty, the plaintiff
sought to avoid the two-year limitations period applicable to personal in-
jury suits.162 Arguing in the alternative that he was a third-party benefici-
ary of the contract between the manufacturer and his employer, the
plaintiff contended that the four-year contract limitations period specified
in the Texas Uniform Commercial Code 163 was applicable. Rejecting this
argument, the court of civil appeals refused to apply the four-year statute,
primarily due to the lack of any contractual relationship between the
plaintiff and the manufacturer. 164 Reversing the court of civil appeals, the
155. Id
156. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5539c (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The statute was
intended to change the result in cases such as Morriss-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91
S.W.2d 313 (1936). See generally McElhaney, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 179, 192 (1970).
157. 604 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
158. Id. at 247.
159. 560 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. 1977).
160. Id at 88-89; see Figari, supra note 70, at 466.
161. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
162. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
163. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Vernon 1968).
164. 598 S.W.2d 24, 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980). The court dismissed the plain-
tiff's claim to third-party beneficiary status with the observation that "there is no indication
that the parties intended to benefit appellant by the contract," id at 29 n.5, and further held
that even one in privity of contract could recover "'only on the basis of a "warranty" in the
commercial sales sense.'" Id at 29 (quoting Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305
A.2d 412, 425 (1973)).
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supreme court concluded that the four-year statute' 65 governs a claim
against a manufacturer for personal injuries resulting from a defective
product when the claim is pleaded as a breach of an implied warranty. 166
In so holding, the supreme court found that privity of contract between an
injured party and the manufacturer is not required. 67
The enforceability of a contractual limitation period was the subject of
Port Arthur Towing Co. v. Mission Ins. Co. ,168 a federal diversity action
governed by Texas law. At issue was an insurance policy clause that estab-
lished a limitations period of twelve months or, alternatively, if the twelve-
month period was invalid under state law, fixed the limitations period at
"the shortest limit of time permitted by the laws of such state." 169 Conced-
ing that the twelve-month period was void under article 5545,170 the de-
fendant claimed that the alternative provision established a permissible
contractual limitation of two years, which was allowed by article 5545.171
Recognizing that the precise issue had not been resolved in Texas, the
court, citingAmerican Surety Co. v. Blaine,17 2 held that the clause properly
established the two-year limitations period that article 5545 permits. 173
VII. PARTIES
In Ferguson v. McCarrell174 the supreme court resolved a conflict among
the courts of civil appeals 175 as to the propriety of a suit against a guaran-
tor in which the maker of the note is not a party. In Ferguson the trial
court granted the plaintiffs motion for severance of its claims against the
maker of the note and then proceeded to trial solely against the guarantors.
The trial resulted in a judgment being entered against the guarantors, and
the guarantors appealed. Rejecting the guarantors' objections that the
judgment rendered against them violated articles 1986176 and 2088,177 the
court of civil appeals held that the specific written contracts under which
the guarantors had agreed to endorse and guarantee the payment of the
note imposed upon them the status of primary obligors. 78 Thus, the court
ruled that the guarantors could be sued directly without the necessity of
165. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Vernon 1968).
166. 610 S.W.2d at 462.
167. Id at 465. In support of this conclusion, the supreme court cited its holding in
Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969), which extended the doctrine of strict
liability to innocent bystanders. Id. at 464. The issue of the plaintiff's third-party benefici-
ary status was ignored by the court.
168. 623 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1980).
169. Id. at 368.
170. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5545 (Vernon 1958).
171. Id
172. 272 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1925, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. 623 F.2d at 370.
174. 588 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam).
175. Compare Ferguson v. McCarrell, 582 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), writ
ref~d nr.e. per curiam, 588 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1979) with Cook v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 538
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
176. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1986 (Vernon 1964).
177. Id art. 2088.
178. 582 S.W.2d at 541.
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joining the original maker of the note. 179 In refusing to grant the applica-
tion for writ of error, the supreme court found that the case was governed
by section 3.416(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, 180 and ex-
pressly disapproved a contrary holding in Cook v. Citizens National
Bank. 181
Underscoring the effect of the 1977 amendments to rule 42,182 the court
in Zauber v. Murray Savings Association 183 held that a shareholder-plain-
tiff bringing a derivative action against a corporation was not required to
satisfy the prerequisites of rule 42;184 rather, a plaintiff in a derivative suit
need satisfy only the requirements of article 5.14(B) of the Texas Business
Corporation Act.185
VIII. DISCOVERY
The most significant developments in the area of discovery were the
changes to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, effective January 1,
1981.186 Rule 167,187 governing production of documents and things, was
completely rewritten and revised in several significant respects. First, the
procedural mechanism for obtaining production was conformed to that of
rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 188 As a result, a showing
of good cause by the requesting party need no longer be made, and a prior
hearing or court order is no longer necessary to enable a party to obtain
such discovery from another party. 189 A response to rule 167 discovery
now must be served in writing' 90 within thirty days of receipt of the re-
quests, 191 either stating that the requests will be granted or objecting
thereto. Any objection must state the specific reasons for the objection. 92
A hearing is required only upon request, 193 which may be made either by a
requesting party unsatisfied with a response, or by a responding party ob-
179. Id at 542.
180. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) (Vernon 1968).
181. 583 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ), discussed in Figari,
supra note 98, at 380. 583 S.W.2d at 895.
182. Prior to the 1977 amendments, rule 42 applied to derivative suits. Tex. R. Civ. P. 42
(1975); see Figari, supra note 91, at 272. As amended in 1977, however, rule 42 is no longer
applicable to derivative suits.
183. 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 601
S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1980), discussed in Folladori, Corporations and Partnerships, p. 234 supra.
184. 591 S.W.2d at 935; TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
185. 591 S.W.2d at 935-36; TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(B) (Vernon 1980).
186. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167-168, 201; see Hagerman, Highlights of Changes in the 1981 Civil
Trial Rules, 43 TEX. B.J. 991 (1980); Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 457-84.
187. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
189. Cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 167 (1978) (requiring a court order, upon motion showing good
cause). Under the amended rule, the request may not be served until a party has filed a
pleading or the time therefor has elapsed. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(2). The request must specify
a reasonable time, place, and manner for production. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(I)(c).
190. TEX. R. Crv. P. 167(l)(d).
191. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(2). This time period may be lengthened or shortened upon a
showing of good cause. Id
192. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(I)(d).
193. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167(3).
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jecting to a request.' 94
Secondly, the scope of rule 167 has now been explicitly broadened, both
as to the type of production that may be sought and the persons from
whom discovery may be sought. 195 A party may now obtain testing or
sampling of tangible things;' 96 may request recordings and data compila-
tions, translated if necessary by the responding party into reasonably usa-
ble form; 197 and may obtain production of documents as they are kept in
the ordinary course of business, or organized and labeled by category in
the request. 98 A party may also obtain production from a nonparty' 99
upon a court order issued after motion, notice to all parties and the non-
party, and a hearing at which objections by any of those required to be
notified may be raised.2°° Unlike discovery from parties, however, a show-
ing of "necessity" must be made by the party seeking such discovery from
a nonparty.20 1
The new version of the rule also permits broader discovery from expert
witnesses. 202 A party "for good cause" shown, upon motion and hearing,
may now obtain a court order requiring the expert to reduce discoverable
factual observations, data, or opinions to written form for production.20 3
Additionally, the rule broadens the discovery obligations of a party alleg-
ing physical or mental injury by requiring him, upon request, to furnish an
authorization for the release of medical records reasonably related to the
injury.2°4 Rule 167 also gives broad scope to the discovery obligations of
194. Id. In addition, the rule is explicitly made subject to the provisions of TEX. R. Civ.
P. 186b, permitting protective orders. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.
195. Nevertheless, the rule is expressly subject to the general provisions of TEX. R. Civ.
P. 186a governing the scope of discovery. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167. Thus, while rule 167 as
amended does not contain the privilege previously set forth in the third paragraph of the old
rule concerning statements of witnesses and intra-party communications, this privilege is
still contained in rule 186a, which is incorporated by reference into amended rule 167. Id.
196. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(1)(a). Such testing may not, however, extend to destruction or
material alteration of the item without notice, hearing, and prior court approval. TEX. R.
Civ. P. 167(l)(g).
197. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(I)(a). This provision extends the items that may be sought to
include computer records. Further, it recognizes that such materials may be unintelligible
unless the person possessing such information deciphers them. A similar recognition is con-
tained in FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1).
198. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(l)(f). The amended federal rule governing production includes
a similar provision. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b). See generally Guittard & Tyler, 1980 Amend-
mens to the Federal Rules of Ci'il Procedure, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 533 (1980).
199. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(4). The old rule did not address this issue, and various court
decisions were in conflict with respect to discovery from nonparties. Compare Neville v.
Brewster, 352 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1961) with Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
200. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(4).
201. Id
202. Experts engaged solely for consultation are, however, not affected, because the pro-
visions of the rule are directed strictly to expert "witnesses." TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(5).
203. Id. Under the old rule a party could discover only then existing reports. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 167 (1978).
204. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(7). Once a party has obtained such records, however, the rule
requires that they be furnished without charge to all other parties at least 14 days prior to
trial. Id Dissemination except for use in the pending case is forbidden. Id
An excellent illustration of the purpose underlying the provision is contained in Martinez
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all responding parties by defining "possession, custody or control" so as to
include a respondent's right to compel production of or entrance from a
third person, including an agency, authority, or representative. 20 5
Thirdly, amended rule 167 explicitly extends a court's power to impose
monetary sanctions for abuse of the discovery process. 206 Unlike prior
practice, 20 7 the court may now impose sanctions not only for failure to
comply with court ordered production but also for "unreasonably frivo-
lous" responses or responses "made for the purpose of delay. '208 Thus,
sanctions are now available both to secure discovery and to punish a
party.20 9 Further, such sanctions are for the first time extended to apply to
the party requesting discovery210 when such requests are "not within the
scope" of rule 167 or are "unreasonably frivolous."'211
Rule 168,212 governing interrogatories to parties, was also extensively
revised by the 1981 amendments. The scope of the interrogatories and the
responses thereto were significantly changed.21 3 The rule also limits the
number of interrogatories that may be served at any one time upon any
one party; a party may not submit interrogatories requiring more than
thirty answers. 214 Further, the rule restricts to two the number of sets of
such interrogatories that may be served on any one party.215 The number
or sets of interrogatories that may be served may be increased only by
agreement of the parties or by a court order entered after hearing upon a
v. Rutledge, 592 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.). In that case
the party seeking discovery of the plaintiffs medical records from a hospital was refused
them because the plaintiff had not given the necessary authorization. The requesting party
was then forced to seek an order compelling the plaintiff to grant the authorization. Upon
the plaintiff's refusal, the trial court dismissed the suit and, on appeal, the court of civil
appeals affirmed, holding that a plaintiff putting his health at issue has no privilege as to
medical records and that the records were within his control in that he had the right to
require their release. Id. at 400-01. Although the Martinez decision is in accordance with
amended rule 167, the rule provides a simpler and surer procedure for reaching the same
result.
205. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(8).
206. TEX. R. Ov. P. 167(3). More specifically, the court may tax the costs of a hearing
necessitated by such conduct, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against the offending
party. Id
207. Under the former rules, sanctions were available only if a party refused to obey a
court order. Tex R. Civ. P. 167, 170, 215a (1978). The sanctions of rule 170, which was not
amended, are still available for refusal to obey a court order under rule 167.
208. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(3). The rule does not, however, explicitly address the issue of
whether and what sanctions may be applied for failure to respond altogether.
209. See Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 465 n.24.
210. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(3). Rule 170, formerly the only rule governing sanctions under
rule 167, refers only to a party's refusal to make discovery. TEX. R. Civ. P. 170.
211. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(3).
212. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
213. Like amended rule 167, however, amended rule 168 is explicitly subject to the gen-
eral scope of discovery set forth in rule 186a. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(2).
214. TEX. R. CIv. P. 168(5). This new provision undoubtedly will be subject to future
judicial construction, because it is unclear when a question requires more than one "an-
swer." For example, a question exists whether an interrogatory requesting a party to "iden-
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showing of good cause. 216
In cases where information sought is contained in public records, the
rule now permits a party to respond by identifying those records. 217 The
rule retains the prior provision permitting a similar response when the in-
formation sought was contained in the business records of the respon-
dent.218 With regard to both business and public records, however, the
rule limits such "identification" responses by requiring the respondent to
"include sufficient detail to permit the interrogating party to readily iden-
tify the individual documents from which the answers may be ascer-
tained."219
Various changes in response procedures were also effected by the
amendments. A party serving interrogatories need no longer provide a
space for each answer;220 rather, the respondent must now begin each an-
swer with the question to which it pertains.221 Additionally, the respon-
dent must now verify the answers, as well as sign them.222 Finally, service
of interrogatories and responses is now required to be made on all par-
ties. 22
3
More significantly, the rule now permits objections to be served at the
same time as answers,224 thus eliminating the prior requirement that objec-
tions be filed fifteen days after the filing of interrogatories.225 Moreover,
for the first time the rule expressly addresses the duty to supplement re-
sponses with respect to the identity and subject matter of expert witness
testimony.226 A party expecting to call an expert witness must supplement
by providing the name, address, and telephone number of the expert as
well as the substance of his testimony.227 The information must be pro-
vided as soon as is practical, but in no event less than fourteen days before
trial begins.228 When such a supplemental response is not "timely made,"
the testimony must be excluded.229
216. Id
217. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(2)(a).
218. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(2)(b).
219. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(2). The federal rule governing interrogatories has also been
amended to include such a provision. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c).
220. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 168 (1978).
221. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(5).
222. Id TEX. R. Civ. P. 14, permitting an agent or attorney to make an affidavit on
behalf of a party, is expressly made inapplicable to this requirement. Id
223. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(5). Previously, no more than four copies were required,
whatever the number of adverse parties. Tex. R. Civ. P. 168 (1978).
224. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(6).
225. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 168 (1978).
226. TEX. R. CIv. P. 168(7)(a)(3). The former version of the rule, containing a general
duty to supplement answers that later became incorrect, was held applicable to information
about expert witnesses. Tex. R. Civ. P. 168 (1978); see Meyerland Co. v. Palais Royal, Inc.,
557 S.W.2d 534, 537-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ). The amended
rule retains the general duty to supplement but adds to it a provision requiring such supple-
mentation to be made not less than 14 days prior to trial. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(7)(a)(I)-(2).
227. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(7)(a)(3).
228. Id
229. Id The court has discretion, hovever, to permit the admission of such testimony if
"good cause sufficient to require its admission exists." Id The 14-day limitation is appar-
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Paralleling the new sanctions permitted under rule 167,230 amended rule
168231 permits the court to impose monetary sanctions 232 against either a
requesting party serving unreasonable, frivolous, or harassing interrogato-
ries or a respondent filing unreasonable, frivolous, or delaying objec-
tions.233 In addition, monetary sanctions are also permitted against a
respondent who fails to make a good faith effort to answer the interrogato-
ries.23 4 Moreover, the rule goes beyond rule 167 by permitting a court that
finds a party to be "abusing the discovery process in seeking, making or
resisting discovery under [rule 168]"235 to impose the sanctions provided in
rules 170 and 215a. 236
Although the scope of and procedure for taking depositions was not al-
tered by the 1981 amendments, changes were made in the rule governing
compelled appearance at depositions.237 As amended, rule 201 has simpli-
fied the process of issuing and serving subpoenas by permitting court
clerks and certified reporters,238 as well as those persons authorized by
statute to take a deposition, to cause a subpoena to be issued and served.
239
Adhering to the broader scope of production permissible under rule
167,240 rule 201 now includes among the items that may be required by a
subpoena duces tecum "recordings and other data compilations. . . trans-
lated, if necessary, by the Respondent . . . into reasonably usable
form."' 24' In addition, rule 201 was amended to permit service upon a
party's attorney 242 where the witness to be deposed is an agent or em-
ployee of a party.243
ently a minimum requirement; thus, a supplementation that meets the test may still be un-
timely, and therefore excludable, in some circumstances.
230. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167(3); see notes 206-11 supra and accompanying text.
231. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(6).
232. Id These include the costs of a hearing and reasonable attorneys' fees necessitated
by the offending party's actions. Id
233. Id The rule now makes clear that answers to interrogatories to which objections
are made are not due until the objections are ruled upon "and for such additional time
thereafter as the court may direct." Id
234. Id.
235. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(8).
236. Id," see TEX. R. Civ. P. 170, 215a. The prior version of rule 168 permitted the
sanctions of rule 215a to be applied without the issuance of a prior order to compel and a
refusal when no answers whatsoever were served; when a party refused to answer some, but
not all, of the interrogtories, such sanctions were appropriate only after an order to compel
was obtained and disobeyed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 168 (1978); see Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins.
Co., 590 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1979). The amended rule does not expressly draw this distinction
in specifying the type of conduct justifying the sanctions of rules 170 or 215a.
237. TEX. R. Civ. P. 201.
238. TEX. R. Civ. P. 201(1); see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2324b (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981).
239. Formerly, only those persons specified in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324a
(Vernon 1971) (official district court reporter), and id. art. 3746 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981)
(officers authorized to execute) could perform this function. Tex. R. Civ. P. 201 (1978).
240. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(I)(a); see notes 195-200 supra and accompanying text.
241. TEX. R. Civ. P. 201(2).
242. TEX. R. Civ. P. 201(3). Thus, a subpoena is no longer necessary to require attend-
ance of an agent or employee of a party. Further, such a person may be required to produce
at the deposition the items specified in § 2 of the rule by designation in the notice. Id
243. Id Such a person must also "be subject to the control of [the] party." Id
19811
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Several court decisions during the survey period addressed the proce-
dures for taking and using depositions. In Burr v. Shannon244 the Texas
Supreme Court considered the permissible procedure for taking and re-
cording a deposition by nonstenographic means.245 The plaintiff in Burr
sought a mandamus ordering the trial court to permit her attorney to de-
pose the defendant by tape recorder and to have the recording reduced to
writing by his secretary, a notary public. The court first noted that a writ-
ten record of a nonstenographic deposition is required by the rule, unless
excused by the court.246 The court then held that under a statutory excep-
tion,247 a noncertified person may make the required written record.248
The court also held, however, that in such a case a protective order249
should be entered by the court to protect the parties and the deponent.250
In Baylor University Medical Center v. Travelers Insurance Co. 251 the
court upheld the admission of testimony from a filed but unsigned deposi-
tion.252 Concluding that an objection to a lack of signature goes to the
form of a deposition, 253 the court based its holding upon rule 212,254 which
bars such objections unless served in writing upon opposing counsel prior
to trial.
IX. DISMISSAL
Rule 164255 provides that a plaintiff may take a nonsuit at any time
"before plaintiff has rested his case, i e., has introduced all his evidence
other than rebuttal evidence .... -256 In O'Brien v. Stanzel,257 a probate
action involving proponents of two different wills, the intervenors 258
moved for a nonsuit after both sets of proponents had rested their cases,
and after a motion for an instructed verdict had been made against the
intervenors' case. The trial court granted the nonsuit and dismissed the
claims of the intervenors without prejudice, and the court of civil appeals
reversed. 259 Defending the action of the trial court, the intervenors argued
on appeal to the supreme court that the trial court had discretion to grant a
244. 593 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1980).
245. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215c.
246. 593 S.W.2d at 677 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 215c(e)).
247. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324b, § 15 (Vernon Supp. 1980-198 1). That excep-
tion makes the requirement of a certified reporter inapplicable "to a party to the litigation,
his attorney, or to a fulltime employee of either." Id.
248. 593 S.W.2d at 678.
249. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 186b.
250. 593 S.W.2d at 678.
251. 587 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
252. Id at 506.
253. Id (citing Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 422 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1967, no writ)).
254. TEX. R. Civ. P. 212.
255. TEX. R. Civ. P. 164.
256. Id.
257. 603 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1980).
258. The intervenors were proponents of an earlier, allegedly lost will and, as such, were
also plaintiffs within the meaning of rule 164.
259. 603 S.W.2d at 826.
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nonsuit even after the right to a nonsuit under rule 164 has expired. Ac-
knowledging that "circumstances may arise which, in a court's discretion,
constitutes [sic] grounds for a nonsuit late in a trial," the supreme court
found no such circumstances on the facts of the case.260 In so holding, the
supreme court emphasized that special circumstances must be present
before a court may properly grant a nonsuit not authorized by rule 164.261
In Extended Services Program, Inc. v. First Extended Service Corp. 262 the
plaintiff had moved the trial court for a nonsuit after a hearing but before
a decision on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Reviewing
the denial of the request for a nonsuit, the court of civil appeals held that a
nonsuit should have been granted, finding that a summary judgment pro-
ceeding is not a trial for purposes of rule 164.263
X. DISQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGE
Until recently, the procedure to be followed in seeking disqualification
of a trial judge was uncertain. Rule 18a,264 which was added by the 1981
amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, has eliminated a major
portion of this uncertainty and establishes a clear and definite procedure
for seeking disqualification.265 Pursuant to the new rule, a motion for dis-
qualification must be filed a minimum of ten days prior to the trial date or
other district court hearing. 266 Grounds for the motion "may include any
disability of the judge to sit in the case."' 267 Copies of the motion must be
served on all other parties or counsel on the date that the motion is filed,
"together with a notice that movant expects the motion to be presented to
the judge three days after the filing of such motion unless otherwise or-
260. Id at 828.
261. Id The court, in a dictum, observed that the intervenors made no claim that an-
other trial would allow them to produce other evidence, thus implying that such a demon-
stration would be necessary to justify granting a nonsuit after a plaintiff rests his case. Id
262. 601 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
263. Id at 471-72. The court, however, did approve the holding in Collins v. Waldo, 291
S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1956, no writ), in which the court refused to grant a
motion for a nonsuit that was made after the trial court announced that it would grant the
defendant's motion for summary judgment but before the entry of the judgment. See also
note 298 infra and accompanying text.
264. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a; see Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 490.
265. Prior to the advent of rule 18a, the only rule addressing procedures for disqualifica-
tion was TEX. R. Civ. P. 528, which applies to proceedings in the justice courts. A statute
did, however, provide limited guidance with respect to the procedure for disqualification of
a trial judge in the district court. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 6 (Vernon
Supp. 1980-198 1) (a district judge is required to request the presiding judge of the adminis-
trative district to assign another judge to hear a motion to recuse). See generally McLeod v.
Harris, 582 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1979).
266. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(a).
267. Id The Texas Constitution provides that "[n]o judge shall sit in any case wherein
he may be interested, or where either of the parties may be connected with him, either by
affinity or consanguinity, within such a degree as may be prescribed by law, or when he shall
have been counsel in the case." TEx. CoNsT. art. V, § I F Statutes that specify grounds for
disqualification include TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 15 (Vernon 1969); id art. 2378
(Vernon 1971); and TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (Vernon 1966). See also State
Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon No. 3(C), TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14 app. (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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dered by the judge. '268
After the motion to disqualify is filed and served, two alternative courses
of action are available to the trial judge. He must either recuse himself2 69
or request the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district to as-
sign a judge to hear the motion. 270 If the judge declines to recuse himself,
he is required to forward to the presiding judge of the administrative judi-
cial district an order of referral, the motion, and all opposing and concur-
ring statements. 27' "Except for good cause stated in the order in which
further action is taken," the trial judge can take no further action "after
filing of the motion and prior to a hearing on the motion. '272 The presid-
ing judge to whom the motion is referred is required immediately to set a
hearing on the motion before himself or another designated judge and is
authorized to enter "orders including orders on interim or ancillary relief
in the pending cause as justice may require. '273
Rule 18a also contains a provision governing the appeal from a ruling
on a motion to disqualify.274 If the motion is denied, the lower court's
action is reviewable for "abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judg-
ment. '275 If the motion is granted, the order is not reviewable, and the
presiding judge must assign another judge to hear the case.276 Although
decided before the enactment of rule 18a, Society of Separationists, Inc. v.
Strobe1277 held that a party seeking a recusal of the trial judge may assert
as error the denial of his motion to disqualify on appeal from a final judg-
ment, irrespective of the party's earlier failure to seek review of the matter
by a writ of mandamus. 278
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The failure of a party to respond to a motion for summary judgment
and its effect on the scope of appellate review were the subject of a number
of decisions during the survey period. As noted in last year's Survey, 279
the leading decision in this area is the supreme court's opinion in City of
Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority. 280 Relying on Clear Creek, the
268. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(b). Any other party may file an opposing or concurring state-
ment at any time before the motion is heard. Id
269. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(c). If the trial judge recuses himself, he "shall make no further
orders and shall take no further action in the case except for good cause stated in the order
in which such action is taken." Id
270. Id
271. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(d).
272. Id
273. Id
274. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(e).
275. Id
276. Id.
277. 593 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
278. Id at 857.
279. See Figari, supra note 31, at 434-36.
280. 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979). For a good discussion of summary judgment practice




supreme court in Fantastic Homes, Inc. v. Combs281 approved a court of
civil appeals ruling that a nonmovant need not respond to a motion for
summary judgment in order to urge on appeal that the movant's proof was
insufficient to establish, as a matter of law, the specific grounds relied upon
in such motion. 28 2 Two other court of civil appeals decisions rendered
during the survey period reached the same conclusion. 283
Fisher v. Capp,284 however, demonstrates how a nonmovant may lose
the right to assert error on appeal by failing to file a written response to his
opponent's motion for summary judgment. Appealing from a summary
judgment entered against him, the nonmovant attempted to raise points of
error regarding the defense of laches and limitations. Finding that the
nonmovant had failed to present expressly those defenses in a written re-
sponse or answer to the motion, the court of civil appeals refused to con-
sider the points of error on appeal. 285 In reaching that result, the court
recognized that the "lesson of Clear Creek is crystal clear." 286 If the non-
movant "does not file a written response to the motion for summary judg-
ment, the only issue before the appellate court is whether the grounds
expressly presented to the trial court by the movant's motion are insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to support summary judgment. '287 Furthermore,
"[a]ny other issue raised by the nonmovant in the appellate court must
have first been raised in the trial court (1) by written specific response or
answer to the motion for summary judgment (2) expressly presenting the
issue to the trial court. '288
Rule 166-A,289 which governs summary judgment practice, provides in
part that "[diefects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be
grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an op-
posing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend. '290 Chandler v. El
Paso National Bank29' represents a classic application of this provision of
the rule. In Chandler the nonmovant, for the first time on appeal, attacked
certain defects in the movant's proof that was submitted in support of the
281. 596 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.), refusing applicationfor writ of error nar.e. per curiam, 584
S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979).
282. 596 S.W.2d at 502.
283. Houchins v. Scheltz, 590 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1979, no writ); Chandler v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 589 S.W.2d 832, 834-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1979, no writ).
284. 597 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
285. Id at 396-97.
286. Id at 397.
287. Id
288. Id; accord, Thurman v. Frozen Food Express, 600 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c), which governs summary
judgment practice and provides that "[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by
written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for
reversal." The term "answer" means "an answer to the motion, not an answer generally
filed in response to a petition." City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d
671, 677 (Tex. 1979).
289. TEx. R. Ov. P. 166-A.
290. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
291. 589 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
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motion for summary judgment. The movant had submitted pleadings
from another action but had failed to have the copies of those pleadings
certified. According to the court, however, the nonmovant waived his ob-
jection to the form of the proof by failing to object at the trial court
level.292 Chandler and the decision of Thurman v. Frozen Food Express293
also demonstrate that neither the movant nor the nonmovant may rely on
his own answers to interrogatories or requests for admissions to support or
defeat a motion for summary judgment. 294
Rule 164,295 which governs nonsuit procedure, provides that "[u]pon the
trial of any case at any time before plaintiff has rested his case, . . . the
plaintiff may take a non-suit, but he shall not thereby prejudice the right of
an adverse party to be heard on his claim for affirmative relief. ' 296 In
Extended Services Program, Inc. v. First Extended Service Corp. 297 the
nonmovant plaintiff filed a motion for nonsuit after the summary judg-
ment hearing but before the trial court pronounced judgment. Reversing
the trial court's action in overruling the motion for nonsuit, the court of
civil appeals held that a summary judgment hearing was not a "trial"
under rule 164 and, therefore, the lower court should have granted the
motion for nonsuit. 298 The court also ruled that summary judgment evi-
dence that was not on file more than twenty-one days prior to the sum-
mary judgment hearing could not be considered by the trial court in ruling
on the motion. 299 Subsequent to Extended Services, rule 166-A was
amended to provide that all supporting affidavits must be filed and served
along with the motion at least twenty-one days before the time specified
for hearing.3°°
XII. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
Several appellate decisions during the survey period focused on the
scope of submission of special issues under rule 277,301 which abolished
292. Id. at 835.
293. 600 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
294. Id. at 370; Chandler v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 589 S.W.2d at 835.
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 164.
296. Id
297. 601 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
298. Id at 471. But see Claude Regis Vargo Enterprises, Inc. v. Bacarisse, 578 S.W.2d
524, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (summary judgment
hearing held to be a "trial" within meaning of TEX. R. Civ. P. 63); Bruce v. McAdoo, 531
S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ) (summary judgment hearing held
to be a "trial" within meaning of TEX. R. Civ. P. 63); Jones v. Houston Materials Co., 477
S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1972, no writ) (summary judgment hear-
ing held to be a "trial" within meaning of TEX. R. Civ. P. 63).
299. 601 S.W.2d at 470. Prior to the 1981 amendments, rule 166-A(c) provided that
"[e]xcept on leave of court, the motion shall be served at least twenty-one days before the
time specified for the hearing." Tex. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c) (1978). The rule did not expressly
contain a similar time limit for affidavits and proof submitted in support of the motion.
300. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c); see Pope & McConnico, supra note 1 at 489. The non-
movant may file and serve counter-affidavits and responses at least seven days before the
hearing. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
301. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
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the former requirement that special issues be submitted distinctly and sep-
arately.30 2 Rule 277 now provides that "[ilt shall be discretionary with the
court whether to submit separate questions with respect to each element of
a case or to submit issues broadly," and that "[it shall not be objectionable
that a question is general or includes a combination of elements or is-
sues." 303 Giving this language full effect, the supreme court in Brown v.
American Transfer & Storage Co. 304 approved the use of broad issues in a
suit to recover under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices--Consumer
Protection Act 30 5 and directed that "[i]ssues in deceptive trade practice
cases . . . should be submitted in terms as close as possible to those actu-
ally used in the statute. '30 6 Similarly, in Siebinlist v. Harvi/e30 7 the
supreme court endorsed the submission of a single issue in a gross negli-
gence action inquiring whether the manner in which the defendant oper-
ated his automobile "was a heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of
others affected by it," followed by a definition of "heedless and reckless
disregard. '30 8 Finally, in Carnation Co. v. Borner,309 a suit for wrongful
discharge of the plaintiff-employee under article 8307c 310 of the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act, the court found no error in the submission of
an issue inquiring whether the defendant-employer had "violated" the
statute. 31'
Under former practice the trial judge was required to frame his charge
so that he did "not therein comment on the weight of the evidence. '31 2
This phrase was deleted by the 1973 amendments to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, 313 and the trial judge is now prohibited only from com-
menting directly on the weight of the evidence.314 While this amendment
relaxed the standard applicable in this area, the court in Otto Vehle & Re-
serve Law Officers Ass'n v. Brenner3t 5 reiterated that a submission to the
jury that assumes a disputed material fact is never a permissible comment
on the weight of the evidence and, therefore, constitutes reversible error.316
302. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (1967). See generally Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex. 461,
240 S.W. 517 (1922).
303. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-4 Better Special Ver-
dict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973); Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special
Verdict-1979, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1979).
304. 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980).
305. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
306. 601 S.W.2d at 937; accord, Willis v. Johnson, 603 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. 1980) (per
curiam). But see Beaty v. Williams, 596 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980,
no writ).
307. 596 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. 1980).
308. Id at 113 & n.1, 114-15.
309. 588 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, af'd, 610 S.W.2d 450
(Tex. 1980).
310. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
311. 588 S.W.2d at 819.
312. Tex. R. Civ. P. 272 (1967).
313. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272; see Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 36 TEX. B.J. 495 (1973).
314. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
315. 590 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
316. Id. at 150; accord, City of Beaumont v. Fuentez, 582 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. Civ.
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The portion of rule 277317 that stipulates that "the court shall submit
such explanatory instructions and definitions as shall be proper to enable
the jury to render a verdict" 318 had a bearing on a number of decisions
during the survey period. Relying upon the general principle that terms of
ordinary meaning are not required to be defined, 319 the court in Holmes v.
Holmes320 concluded that the term "intentional," as used in the charge to
the jury in an assault case, was a common term and necessitated no defini-
tion.321 The court in Stewart v. Moody322 considered a submission that
asked the jury what sum of money, if any, would "reasonably and fairly
compensate" the plaintiff for any "damages" he may have suffered as a
result of "the occurrence in question," without any specification of the
proper measure of damages.323 The court concluded that the lack of a
damage standard constituted reversible error because it permitted the jury
to take into account anything it considered as constituting damages. 324 In
contrast, the court in Velasquez v. Levingston 325 endorsed the action of the
trial court in refusing to instruct the jury concerning a presumption.326
While agreeing that the presumption applied to the case, the appellate
court stated that "it does not follow that such a presumption should be
presented to the jury in the form of an instruction," as "the only effect of
this presumption is to fix the burden of producing evidence" and "[it] is
not evidence of something to be weighed along with the evidence. '327
Rule 274,328 which governs the making of objections to the charge of the
trial court, requires that an objecting party "point out distinctly" the mat-
ter to which he objects and state the grounds of his objection.329 Faced
with an objection to a special issue on the grounds that the issue was
"global," one court330 during the survey period authoritatively held that
such an objection was insufficient and failed to satisfy the specificity re-
quirements of rule 274.331
XIII. JURY PRACTICE
Although rule 233 provides that "[e]ach party to a civil suit shall be
App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); Cactus Drilling Co. v. Williams, 525 S.W.2d 902, 906-07
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
317. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
318. Id
319. See G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 37 (1959).
320. 588 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
321. Id at 675; see Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979).
322. 597 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
323. Id at 558.
324. Id; accord, Planet Plows, Inc. v. Evans, 600 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1980, no writ).
325. 598 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
326. Id at 348.
327. Id; accord, Sanders v. Davila, 593 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
328. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274.
329. Id
330. Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980).
331. Id at 938.
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entitled to six peremptory challenges in a case tried in the district
court," 332 the fact that a person is named as a party to a suit does not in
itself entitle him to six peremptory challenges. 333 In order for two defend-
ants to be entitled to more than six peremptory challenges between them,
the interests of those defendants must be antagonistic on an issue with
which the jury is concerned.334 Article 2151 a,3 3 5 which interacts with rule
233, states that "[a]fter proper alignment of parties, it shall be the duty of
the court to equalize the number of peremptory challenges provided under
Rule 233, . . . in accordance with the ends of justice so that no party is
given an unequal advantage .... -336 In Lorusso v. Members Mutual In-
surance Co. 337 the plaintiff alleged that the trial court had erroneously
granted the two defendants six peremptory challenges each. Relying on
rule 503,338 a divided supreme court determined that a trial court's misal-
location of peremptory challenges would not be presumed to be prejudicial
and, therefore, the harmless error rule applied for purposes of appellate
review.339 Reviewing the limited record that the plaintiff brought forward
on appeal, the court concluded that the plaintiff "failed to establish that
the error in the number of peremptory challenges granted defendant re-
sulted in a 'materially unfair' trial so as to require a reversal under Rule
503."1340
Two recent court of civil appeals decisions also addressed the procedure
relating to peremptory challenges. The first, Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v.
Perez,34 1 involved a consolidated personal injury action between thirty-
two plaintiffs and numerous defendants. Prior to the commencement of
voir dire examination, the trial court was informed that a tentative settle-
ment342 had been reached between the plaintiffs and one of the defendants
and that no adversity existed between the plaintiffs and that defendant.
332. TEX. R. Civ. P. 233.
333. See, e.g., Retail Credit Co. v. Hyman, 316 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton 1958, writ refd). If a group of litigants has essentially common interests and is not
antagonistic on an issue of fact, the group is considered to be only one "party" under rule
233. Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. 1974).
334. Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. 1973).
335. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2151a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
336. Id A leading case on the proper procedure for alignment of parties is Patterson
Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1979), discussed in Figari, supra note 31, at 441-
42.
337. 603 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1980) (5-4 decision).
338. TEX. R. Civ. P. 503, provides in part:
[Tihat no judgment shall be reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered in any
cause on the ground that an error of law has been committed by the trial court
in the course of the trial, unless the appellate court shall be of the opinion that
the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the peti-
tioner as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendi-
tion of an improper judgment in the case ....
339. 603 S.W.2d at 821.
340. Id at 822.
341. 591 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
342. The form of settlement agreement proposed and eventually entered into was a
"Mary Carter" agreement, which resulted in the acquisition by the settling defendant of a
direct financial interest in the plaintiff's lawsuit. See generally General Motors Corp. v.
Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1977).
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Notwithstanding this information, the trial court allotted six peremptory
challenges to the plaintiffs and four challenges to the settling defendant.
The other three defendants received a total of fourteen peremptory chal-
lenges.343 Furthermore, the trial court ordered the parties to exercise their
challenges individually.344 On appeal from an unfavorable judgment, one
of the defendants complained that the settling defendant and the plaintiffs
should have received only six peremptory challenges between them. Re-
jecting this argument, the court of civil appeals stated that "the action of a
trial court in apportioning strikes must of necessity be evaluated in terms
of information available at the time the challenges are allocated-not on
the basis of changes in the alignment of parties which may possibly occur
thereafter during the course of the trial. ' 345 In finding that the trial court
had not abused its discretion, the appellate court relied heavily on the lack
of a definite settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the settling
defendant at the time the jury was selected. 346 In Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Shflet1347 the court of civil appeals found that any error in the trial
court's allotment of peremptory challenges was waived because the de-
fendant failed to lodge a timely objection in the trial court.348
Rule 216349 requires that a jury demand be made and the jury fee be
paid "on or before appearance day or, if thereafter, a reasonable time
before the date set for trial of the cause on the non-jury docket, but not less
than ten days in advance. '350 In Young v. Young 351 the jury demand was
not made until fourteen days prior to the date set for a nonjury trial. Find-
ing that an unreasonable delay of the trial would result, the trial court
concluded that the demand was not timely.352 On appeal, the court of civil
appeals held that the trial court's action was justified because the next
available jury setting was six months later.353 The appellate court also
noted that "[a] demand for jury made ten days in advance is not necessar-
ily timely as a matter of law. ' '354
Two decisions during the survey period addressed the permissible scope
of final jury arguments. Appealing from an adverse judgment, the defend-
343. One of the defendants, who received four peremptory challenges, was also a plain-
tiff in the action. 591 S.W.2d at 921.
344. Id
345. Id
346. Id at 921-22.
347. 593 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
348. Id. at 772; see Lewis v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 151 Tex. 95, 246 S.W.2d 599
(1952). For the same reason, failure to lodge a timely complaint, the court also found that
the defendant waived its objection to the trial court's action in failing to allot equal time for
jury argument. 593 S.W.2d at 772.
349. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216.
350. Id
351. 589 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ dism'd).
352. Id
353. Id. at 521.
354. Id ; see Texas Oil & Gas Corp. y. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 877 (Tex. 1968); Jackson v.
Jackson, 524 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ); Sylvester v. Griffin,
507 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
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ant in Harrison v. Harrison35. complained that the plaintiffs attorney had
made improper references in his closing argument that invited the jury to
speculate as to whether the defendant was covered by insurance. The
plaintiff's attorney had stated that the jury should not consider "who pays"
the judgment and should answer certain issues "regardless of whether
[plaintiff] John Edd ever gets a quarter or not. . . or regardless of from
where or anything else."'356 Additionally, the plaintiffs attorney had in-
formed the jury that he could not tell them certain "things" but that
"you're going to wonder, since these boys [i e., plaintiff and defendant]
ain't got no dispute between each other what are we doing up here."
357
The court of civil appeals concluded that the references were not im-
proper.358
In Queen City Land Co. v. State,359 an eminent domain proceeding, the
state's attorney remarked in closing argument that he did not blame the
defendant "for trying to get all he can" and that the jury may refer "to it as
greed or something of that nature. '360 Recognizing that the use of the
term "greed" was improper, the court of civil appeals nevertheless held
that the defendant had waived its complaint by "failing to object and press
for an instruction at the time of argument."' 361 In the same case, the appel-
late court also ruled that the use of a calculator by the jury was not mis-
conduct. 362
Finally, jury qualifications and misconduct were also the subject of re-
cent judicial consideration. In Strange v. Treasure City3 6 3 the supreme
court reversed a finding by the court of civil appeals that alleged jury mis-
conduct was "of such a nature and degree that a fair trial to appellant has
been denied.' '364 The court noted that under rule 327365 the party seeking
a new trial must show that the misconduct was material, and that the mis-
conduct probably injured the complaining party.366 Although one juror
had made a statement of personal bias that the court considered material,
the court found that it did not result in probable injury to the defendant. 367
355. 597 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ reftd n.r.e.).
356. Id at 487.
357. Id
358. Id at 488; see Benevides v. Peche, 460 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1970, writ reed n.r.e.); Renegar v. Cramer, 354 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1962, writ refd n.r.e.); Airline Motor Coaches v. Green, 217 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1949, writ refd n.r.e.). But see Griffith v. Casteel, 313 S.W.2d 149, 156-57
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1958, writ refd n.r.e.).
359. 601 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
360. Id at 530.
361. Id
362. Id; see Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Goldstein, 567 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (use by jury of calculator held proper); Solana v. Hill, 348
S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ refd n.r.e.) (use by jury of slide rule
held proper).
363. 608 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. 1980).
364. 590 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979).
365. TEx. R. Civ. P. 327.
366. 608 S.W.2d at 606.
367. Id at 607-08.
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Examining the other points of alleged misconduct, including discussions of
attorney's fees, insurance, and taxes, 368 the court concluded that the re-
quirements of rule 327 had not been met and that the record as a whole
did not show that the cumulative effect of the incidents resulted in proba-
ble injury.369
In Bailey v. Tuck 370 the appellant claimed that the trial court erred in
failing to grant a new trial because one of the jurors was illiterate and,
thus, was not qualified to serve on the jury. The court of civil appeals,
however, found that the appellant had waived any objection to the chal-
lenged juror due to the appellant's failure to complain until after an unfa-
vorable verdict had been rendered.371 The court also rejected the
appellant's contention that a new trial should have been granted because
one juror translated some of the special issues into Spanish for another
juror during their deliberations. 372
XIV. JUDGMENT
Although former rule 306a 373 designated that the date of the signing of
the judgment should be used in determining the time for actions taken in
connection with a judgment, many of the rules contained confusing refer-
ences to "rendition" of judgment.374 As part of the simplification that the
1981 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure effected, the
amended rules uniformly substitute the signing of the judgment or other
order as the operative event for the calculation of time.375 In still another
amendment, rule 731376 was modified to allow execution to issue in the
name of a defendant as well as a plaintiff in a trial of right of property. 377
In Jarrell v. Norlhcutt,378 a bill of review procedure to set aside the
property settlement entered in a prior divorce, the supreme court held that
a showing of "lack of fault or negligence in permitting a meritorious de-
fense to go unasserted in a prior action" was essential to the plaintiff's
petition.379 In Coon v. Pettiohn & Pettyohn Plumbing, Inc. 380 the court
368. Id at 606-09.
369. Id at 609.
370. 591 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
371. Id See generally 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 11.05 (1970).
372. 591 S.W.2d at 609.
373. Tex. R, Civ. P. 306a (1978). For a discussion of the new version of TEX. R. Civ. P.
306a, see notes 414-18 infra and accompanying text.
374. See, e.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 296, 300-305, 306b (1978).
375. E.g., TEX. R. Civ. P. 296 (time to request conclusions of law and fact); TEX. R. Civ.
P. 297 (time to file findings and conclusions); TEX. R. Civ. P. 306b (time to perfect appeal
from nunc pro tunc); TEX. R. Civ. P. 524 (justice court docket to reflect date of signing);
TEx. R. Crv. P. 566 (time for justice to set aside default judgment); TEX. R. Civ. P. 627 (time
for issuance of execution); TEX. R. Civ. P. 657 (time judgment final for garnishment).
376. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 731 with Tex. R. Civ. P. 733 (1978).
377. Comments to this amendment recite that the change was made to conform to the
due process requirements of North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US. 600
(1972). TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 299 (West 10th ed. 1981).
378. 592 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. 1980).
379. Id at 930-31,
380. 587 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
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held that a default judgment in a suit upon a sworn account cannot be
supported by a sworn pleading that is insufficient under rule 185.38 1
XV. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
Several of the rules governing motions for new trial were affected by the
1981 amendments. The most significant change was made in rule 329b,382
which sets forth the timetable to be followed for a motion for a new trial
and for any subsequent appeal. A motion for a new trial must now be filed
within thirty days "after the judgment or other order complained of is
signed. ' 383 Any number of amended motions may be filed within the
thirty days, provided that the amended motion is filed before the preceding
motion is overruled. 384 Motions not ruled on by the court are now over-
ruled by operation of law seventy-five days after the judgment or other
order complained of is signed.385 Further, the parties may no longer agree
to postpone this deadline. 386
The trial court still has plenary power to vacate, modify, correct, or re-
form the judgment, or to grant a new trial within thirty days after the judg-
ment is signed. 387 The period for exercising the power, however, is-now
extended by the filing of a timely motion for new trial for an additional
thirty days after all such motions are overruled, whether by signed order or
by operation of law.388 The amended rule also codifies prior common law
that clerical errors may be corrected at any time, 389 and that modification,
correction, or reformation of the judgment starts anew the running of time
for appeal.390
381. Id at 552-53; TEX. R. Civ. P. 185. For a discussion of the pleading defects fatal to
the judgment in that case, see text accompanying notes 152-55 supra.
382. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
383. Id This change enlarges the time to file the motion from 10 to 30 days, and, consis-
tent with other rule changes, starts the time running upon the signing of the judgment, in-
stead of the less precise rendition ofjudgment. See text accompanying notes 373-75 supra.
The movant is no longer required to "present" the motion to the trial court. See Tex. R.
Civ. P. 329b(4) (1978).
384. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(b). The former rule allowed only one amended motion to be
filed within 20 days of the filing of the original motion, and before the original motion was
overruled. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(2) (1978).
385. TaX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c). This amendment simplifies the timetable by consolidating
three separate timetables from the former rule: (1) 10 days from judgment to file original
motion; (2) 20 days from filing original motion to file amended motion; (3) 45 days from last
motion until motion overruled by operation of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(l)-(3) (1978).
386. Tax. R. Civ. P. 329b; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(3) (1978).
387. Tax. R. Civ. P. 329b(d).
388. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e). No extension of the 30 days during which the court had
plenary power resulted from the filing of a timely motion under the former rule. Tex. R.
Civ. P. 329b(5) (1978). Now, with a timely motion for a new trial, a court can vacate, mod-
ify, correct, or reform a judgment or grant a new trial as late as 105 days after the judgment
is signed.
389. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(o. See generally 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE
§ 17.08.1 (Elliott rev. ed. 1971); Reavley & Orr, Trial Court's Power to AmendIts Judgments,
25 BAYLOR L. REV. 191 (1973).
390. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b(h); see City of West Lake Hills v. State ex rel City of Austin,
466 S.W.2d 722, 727 (Tex. 1971). The rule expressly states that "any" such modification has
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Rule 324391 has been amended to make a motion for a new trial neces-
sary to present a complaint "upon which evidence must be heard, such as
one of jury misconduct or of newly discovered evidence. '392 The amend-
ments have dropped the requirement that a motion for a new trial be made
in order to present any complaint "which ha[d] not otherwise been ruled
upon."39 3
Rules 320394 and 321395 were both amended to clarify motion for new
trial terminology; the motion is now required to set forth "points" relied
upon rather than "grounds" for granting the motion.396 Under the new
version of rule 329,397 the signing of the judgment begins the two-year
period for granting a new trial after a default judgment entered on citation
by publication. 398
The supreme court has evidenced a liberal approach to motions for a
new trial in two recent cases. In Airco, Inc. v. TIerina399 the defendant
stumbled into one of the procedural traps that amended rule 329b 4°° will
eliminate. The defendant mailed to the clerk a motion for a new trial and
a motion for remittitur in the same envelope; the motion for remittitur was
filed first. Less than twenty days later, the defendant filed an amended
motion for a new trial. The trial court overruled the amended motion and
the defendant filed a certificate of deposit40 less than thirty days later.402
The court of civil appeals ruled that the motion for remittitur was actually
a motion for a new trial, thus making the motion for a new trial that was
filed subsequent to the motion for remittitur the one permissible amended
motion for a new trial.40 3 As a result, the court ruled that the certificate of
deposit was filed late and accordingly dismissed the appeal.4°4 In revers-
ing, the supreme court relied upon the principle that "[aippellate review
• . . is a valuable right and should not be denied when under a liberal
interpretation of the Rules it is possible to give it. '405 The court therefore
this effect. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(h). The amendment, however, does not state that the time
limits for filing a motion for new trial start anew after such a modification; it refers only to
"the time for appeal." Id
391. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324.
392. Id; see notes 429-30 infra and accompanying text.
393. Tex R. Civ. P. 324 (1978). TEX. R. Civ. P. 373, however, still requires a party to
make "known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to
the action of the court and his grounds therefor."
394. TEX. R. Civ. P. 320.
395. TEX. R. Civ. P. 321.
396. These amendments were part of the broader effort to make the rules consistent. See,
e.g., TEX. R. Civ. P. 458, 515.
397. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329.
398. Id. This chan&e is one of those designed to eliminate rendition of judgment as an
operative act and substitute in its place the signing of the judgment. See notes 373-75 supra
and accompanying text.
399. 603 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. 1980).
400. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
401. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(a) authorizes a deposit of cash in lieu of a cost bond.
402. 603 S.W.2d at 786.
403. 598 S.W.2d 5, 6-7 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979) (per curiam).
404. Id.
405. 603 S.W.2d at 786 (quoting Bay v. Mecom, 393 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex. 1965)).
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refused to adopt a technical view of the pleadings and held that the mo-
tions for remittitur and for a new trial should not be construed to be sepa-
rate motions for new trial.4°6
In Howell v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 407 the supreme court observed that
"[t]he intent of Rule 324 was to eliminate motions for new trial. ' 40 8 Ac-
cordingly, while the supreme court refused the writ of error, finding no
reversible error, the court disapproved the court of civil appeals' hold-
ing4 0 9 that a motion for a new trial was necessary in a nonjury case to
preserve error by the trial court in sustaining special exceptions based on
the bar of limitations. 410
A good discussion of the elements of a motion for a new trial sufficient
to warrant the reversal of a default judgment is found in Mitchell v.
Webb .411 Observing that such matters are within the discretion of the trial
court, the court of civil appeals affirmed the denial of the defendant's mo-
tion because it failed to offer to reimburse the plaintiff for any costs in-
curred in securing the default judgment and because it failed to recite that




During the survey period major changes in appellate procedure were
effected by amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.4 13 The
starting point for these changes was rule 306a,414 which was amended to
provide that the time period for filing documents connected with perfect-
ing an appeal415 is measured from the date a judgment or order is signed,
"as shown of record."' 416 Although the rule specifically directs the parties
and the court to have the signature date recited within the judgment or
406. 603 S.W.2d at 786. Two amendments to rule 329b have eliminated this problem:
there is now no limit on the number of amended motions for new trial which one may file;
and calculation of the date for filing the cost bond is now made from the date of the signing
of the judgment, without regard to when a motion for new trial is filed. TEX. R. Civ. P.
329b.
407. 599 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1980). See also note 430 infra.
408. 599 S.W.2d at 802.
409. 595 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980).
410. 599 S.W.2d at 801.
411. 591 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
412. Id. The court found the defendant's recitation that the granting of the motion
would not delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff insufficient, absent the offer to proceed
immediately to trial. Id
413. See Boyd, New Amendments to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.- From Judgment to
Appeal, 43 TEX. B.J. 1040 (1980); Hagerman, Highlights of Changes in the 1981 Civil Trial
Rules, 43 TEx. B.J. 991 (1980); Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 492-532. See also note 1
supra and accompanying text.
414. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
415. The rule expressly mentions motions for new trials, appeal bonds, notices of appeal,
affidavits in lieu of bond, bills of exception, the transcript, and the statement of facts, but is
not limited to those documents. Id
416. Id Thus, the various steps for perfecting an appeal now measure from a single
uniform act. Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a (1978), in contrast, merely provided that the date of the
signing of the judgment or order was to be used in determining the time periods within
which such steps were to be taken.
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order,417 the absence of this recitation is not fatal; the date may be deter-
mined by a showing "in the record by a certificate of the judge or other-
wise.418
In keeping with the underlying purpose of the 1981 amendments, to sim-
plify the procedures for appeal,419 the rules governing appeals from bench
trials have been amended. Rule 297420 now provides that upon proper
request 421 the judge must file findings of fact and conclusions of law within
thirty days after the signing of the judgment or order overruling a motion
for a new trial.422
In addition to simplifying the procedures for filing motions for a new
trial,423 the 1981 amendments made several significant changes in motions
for new trial practice insofar as appeals are concerned. Under rule
329b,424 amended motions for a new trial no longer extend the time period
for perfecting an appeal.425 On the other hand, motions for modifications,
corrections, or reformations of the judgment, which are now governed by
rule 329b,426 extend the time for perfecting an appeal "in the same manner
as a motion for new trial,"427 and the time for appeal runs from the date of
the signing of such a modified judgment.428
Amended rule 324429 now provides that a motion for a new trial is not a
prerequisite to appeal except "in order to present a complaint upon which
evidence must be heard, such as one of jury misconduct or newly discov-
ered evidence. '430 The amendments also alter the effect a timely motion
417. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
418. Id This addition to the rule liberalizes the method for determining the date of
signing if it is not reflected within the order itself.
419. See Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 492-93.
420. TEX. R. Civ. P. 297.
421. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296 requires a party desiring findings of fact and conclusions of law
to file a request within 10 days after the judgment is signed or a motion for a new trial is
overruled expressly or by operation of law. In contrast, former rule 296 required the request
to be made within 10 days after the "rendition" of judgment or order overruling motion for
new trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 296 (1978). In keeping with the intent underlying rule 306a, to
establish the date of the signing of the judgment or order as the critical date, the 1981
amendments uniformly deleted confusing references in the rules to "rendition" or "entry" of
judgments and orders. See notes 373-75 supra and accompanying text.
422. TEX. R. Civ. P. 297. The rule formerly required filing of the findings and conclu-
sions 30 days before the time for filing the transcript. Tex. R. Civ. P. 297 (1976).
423. See notes 382-85 supra and accompanying text.
424. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
425. Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(3) (1978), determination of a motion for a new trial that
had been amended was required to be made within certain periods after the date the
amended motion was filed. The amendment extended the allowable periods for perfecting
appeals, which date from the overruling of a motion for a new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
356(2) (1978). The present rule requires that the determination be made within a certain
period after the judgment is signed, and the periods for perfecting an appeal run uniformly
om the date the judgment is signed. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c), 356.
426. TEX. R. CIv. P. 329b(g); see notes 388-90 supra and accompanying text.
427. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(g).
428. Id
429. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324.
430. Id This provision is substituted for one that required a motion for new trial "in
order to present a complaint which has not otherwise been ruled on." See Tex. R. Civ. P.
324 (1978). The former provision left an ambiguity as to the necessity of motions for a new
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for a new trial has on the time allowed for perfecting an appeal. The filing
of such a motion now extends the time within which a required cost
bond 431 or notice of appeal must be filed to ninety days after the judgment
is signed.432 Thus, the date the judgment is signed determines the time to
perfect appeal rather than the date the motion for a new trial is over-
ruled.433 Further, one party may rely on a motion filed by any other party
to extend the time for appeal.434 In the absence of a motion for a new trial
by any party, however, the bond or notice of appeal must be filed within
thirty days after the judgment is signed.435
Amended rule 356,436 in addition to providing an automatic ninety-day
extension when a motion for new trial is filed,4 37 also permits a party to
move for an extension of time within which to perfect the appeal by filing
a cost bond, an affidavit, or a notice of appeal.438 In order to obtain such
an extension, the party must file a motion with the appellate court "reason-
ably explaining" the need for the extension439 within fifteen days after the
last day for perfecting the appeal."40 Significantly, however, during the
same period the party must also file the necessary cost bond, affidavit, or
notice with the trial court. 4 1 Although the language of the rule is not
explicit, the courts apparently will require the necessary filing of a cost
bond or a notice not only within the fifteen-day period, but simultaneously
with or prior to the filing of the motion to extend. 4 2 Of extreme signifi-
trial in nonjury cases, which resulted in a conflict among the courts of civil appeals. Com-
pare Brock v. Brock, 586 S.W.2d 927, 929-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ) with
Brown v. Brown, 590 S.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ). This
conflict was resolved in Howell v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 599 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1980),
when the supreme court, disapproving Brock, held that a motion for a new trial was unnec-
essary in a nonjury case to complain of the insufficiency of the evidence or to complain of a
dismissal after the sustaining of special exceptions. 599 S.W.2d at 802.
431. The same provisions governing cost bonds also govern an affidavit of inability filed
in lieu thereof. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(a).
432. TEx. R. Civ. P. 356(a), (c).
433. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 356(a) (1978).
434. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356. This is a significant change from the prior practice, which
prevented one party from relying on another party's motion for a new trial to extend the
date for filing the bond, notice, or affidavit necessary to appeal. See, e.g., Angelina County
v. McFarland, 374 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. 1964).
435. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(a), (c). The rule formerly required such a filing within 30 days
after the rendition of a judgment or an order overruling a motion for a new trial. Tex. R.
Civ. P. 356(a) (1978).
436. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356.
437. See note 432 supra and accompanying text.
438. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(b). Rule 21c, formerly the only rule authorizing extensions of
time on appeal, has never applied to cost bonds, affidavits, or notices of appeal, but only to
transcripts, statements of fact, motions for rehearing, and applications for writ of error to the
supreme court. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c.
439. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(b). This requirement parallels that of TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c. For
an explanation of the "reasonably explaining" requirement, see Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549
S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977). See also Figari, supra note 22, at 423-24.
440. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(b).
441. Id Unlike rule 21c, which merely requires the moving party to file the motion
within 15 days of the otherwise applicable date for filing the document and gives the appel-
late court the discretion as to the length of the extension, rule 356 requires that the document
itself actually be filed within the 15-day period as well. Id
442. See Minutes, Hearing Before Advisory Committee 66 (Nov. 16, 1979), in which
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cance is the fact that the extension of time provided in rule 356 is a one-
time extension for only fifteen days;443 with this one exception, the timely
filing of a cost bond or a notice of appeal remains a jurisdictional prerequi-
site to an appeal.4"
Changes were also made in the time periods within which the steps to
perfect an appeal by affidavit of inability to pay costs are required. 445 The
affidavit must now be filed within the same time periods as a cost bond or
a notice of appeal, i e., thirty days from signing of judgment or, if a timely
motion for a new trial is filed, ninety days from the signing of the judg-
ment.4 6 In addition, a specific provision of rule 355 44 7 requires that notice
of the filing of the affidavit be given to the opposing party within two
days.44 8 Thereafter, any party or interested court officer may file a contest
to the affidavit within ten days of the filing of the affidavit.449 Although
the affiant party still has the burden of proof as to his inability to pay
costs, 450 failure to file a timely contest or to obtain a ruling on the contest
within ten days after its filing results in an automatic overruling of the
contest.45' On the other hand, if a contest is sustained, the time for filing
the bond is extended for ten days from the date of the sustaining order
unless the trial court recites therein that the affidavit was not filed in good
faith.45 2
The sweeping changes of the 1981 amendments also affected the time
periods for perfecting appeals from interlocutory orders and quo warranto
proceedings.453 Now called "accelerated appeals,' ' 454 these appeals are
perfected by filing the bond, deposit, affidavit, or notice within thirty days
after the judgment or order is signed.455 Motions for a new trial are pro-
Judge Clarence Guittard stated: "[The movant] has to file his bond when he files his mo-
tion."
443. See notes 438-40 supra and accompanying text.
444. See Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 501.
445. TEX. R. Civ. P. 355, 356(a).
446. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(a). The 15-day extension permitted by rule 356(b) is also appli-
cable to affidavits of inability. The former version of rule 356 required the affidavit to be
filed within 20 days after the rendition of a judgment or an order overruling a motion for a
new trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 356(b) (1978).
447. TEx. R. Civ. P. 355(b).
448. Id The rule formerly required that notice be given "forthwith." Tex. R. Civ. P.
355(b) (1978).
449. TEx. R. Civ. P. 355(c). The 10-day period for filing a contest formerly dated from
the notice. Tex. R. Civ. P. 355(c) (1978).
450. TEX. R. Civ. P. 355(d); accord, Tex. R. Civ. P. 355(d) (1978).
451. TEX. R. Civ. P. 355(e). Under the prior version of the rule, only a failure to file the
contest timely would have this effect. Tex. R. Civ. P. 355(e) (1978). The rule now makes
clear that a ruling must be made within 10 days of the affidavit's filing.
452. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(b). This provision together with the 10-day ruling requirement
should eliminate the harsh results reached in cases such as King v. Payne, 156' Tex. 105, 110,
292 S.W.2d 331, 334 (1956) (delay in acting on contest does not extend time for filing appeal
cost bond).
453. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(d).
454. TEx. R. Civ. P. 385.
455. TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(d). Previously, these documents were required to be filed within
20 days after the rendition of the order appealed from. Tex. R. Civ. P. 385(a) (1978).
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hibited in the case of appeals from interlocutory orders456 and, although
permitted in quo warranto proceedings, the motions do not extend the time
for perfecting appeal.457
The 1981 amendments also altered the procedure for perfecting an ap-
peal. Notices of appeal continue to be unnecessary as an appeal prerequi-
site458 unless the law does not require a cost bond.459 When a notice is
necessary, however, rule 356 now requires that it be filed in writing with
the trial court.460 The rule expressly eliminates oral notice or recitals in
the judgment as proper methods to give notice of appeal. 46'
Rule 354,462 governing cost bonds, was amended to add "interested of-
ficers of the court" to the class of persons who may seek an increase or
decrease in the amount of the bond.463 Further, the amendments make
clear that only the trial court may make such a determination for a period
of thirty days after the bond is filed;464 the appellate court will not enter-
tain such a motion until that period has expired.465 The rule also states
that an order increasing the amount of bond does not "affect perfecting of
the appeal. ' 466 The clerk and reporter need not prepare the record until
the order is complied with, and failure to comply with such an order will
result in dismissal of the appeal or affirmance of the judgment. 467
Changes were also made in the procedures for filing a deposit in lieu of
bond. It is now sufficient to file a cash deposit of $500, less such sums as
456. TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(b). See also Tex. R. Civ. P. 385(e) (1978).
457. TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(c).
458. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(c). The provision requiring notice of appeal only in limited
cases was formerly contained in Tex. R. Civ. P. 354(c) (1978). On the other hand, notices of
limitation of appeal continue to be essential if the appellant wishes to limit the issues that
may be raised before the appellate court. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 353. Such notices are now
required to be filed within 15 days after the judgment is signed or, if a motion for a new trial
is filed, within 75 days after the judgment is signed. Cf Tex. R. Civ. P. 353 (1978) (notice
must be filed within 15 days after rendition of judgment or order overruling motion for new
trial).
459. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 29 (Vernon 1980); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 279a (Vernon 1973); id art. 1174 (Vernon 1963); id art. 2072 (Vernon 1964); id art.
2276 (Vernon 1971).
460. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(c).
461. Id Even before this clarification of the rule, the supreme court in Texas Animal
Health Comm'n v. Nunley, 598 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. 1980), held that a recitation in the judg-
ment and a request for preparation of the transcript were insufficient to comply with the rule
governing notices of appeal; the court concluded that a separate notice of appeal filed with
the clerk was a prerequisite to appeal. Id at 234.
462. TEX. R. Civ. P. 354.
463. TEX. R. Civ. P. 354(a). Volpe v. Stephens, 589 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1979, no writ), illustrates the reason for this change. In that case the appellant filed a $500
bond and requested the court reporter to prepare a statement of facts; the court reporter
refused to do so unless a further deposit was made. The court of civil appeals held that the
reporter was required to prepare the statement of facts, that the $500 bond was sufficient on
its face unless challengedby a party, and that the reporter's only remedy was by way of a
motion in the appellate court to require an additional bond. Id at 811-12.
464. TEX. R. Civ. P. 354(a).
465. Id See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 365, governing the procedure for increasing bond by
motion in the appellate court.
466. TEX. R. Civ. P. 354(a).
467. Id
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the appellant has paid on the costs. 468 As is the case with a bond, any
party or "interested officer of the court" may seek an increase or decrease
in the amount of the deposit.469
Once the appeal is perfected, the record must be prepared and filed.
Prior to 1978, filing of the record within the time allowed was a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to appeal.470 In 1978 the rules were amended to permit
a party to obtain an extension of time for filing the record. 471 Continuing
the liberalizing trend, the 1981 amendments altered both the time periods
for filing the record and the effect of a failure to file within the prescribed
time period. Rule 386472 now provides that the transcript and the state-
ment of facts in unaccelerated appeals are to be filed in the appellate court
sixty days after the judgment is signed, or, when a timely motion for a new
trial has been filed, within 100 days after the judgment is signed.473 In
cases of accelerated appeals,474 the record must be filed within the same
period as the bond or other perfecting document,475 that is, within thirty
days after the judgment or order is signed.476
Significantly, however, the amended rules also state that failure to file
within the prescribed times "shall not affect the court's jurisdiction or its
authority to consider material filed late."'477 In accordance with this provi-
sion, the clerk of the appellate court is no longer empowered to refuse to
file a tardy transcript or statement of facts.478 Nevertheless, because late
filing is an express ground for dismissing an appeal, affirming the judg-
ment,479 disregarding untimely materials, or applying adverse presump-
tions,480 an appellant who is unable to file the record on time should seek
468. Id Under the prior version of the rule, a cash deposit was permissible, but it was
required to be in an amount determined by the clerk to be sufficient to cover the estimated
costs in the trial court and the cost of the record less amounts already paid. Tex. R. Civ. P.
354(a) (1978).
469. TEx. R. Civ. P. 354(a); see note 463 supra and accompanying text.
470. See, e.g., Matlock v. Matlock, 151 Tex. 308, 313, 249 S.W.2d 587, 590 (1952).
471. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c.
472. TEX. R. Civ. P. 386.
473. Id. Formerly, the rule required the filing of the record within 60 days after the
rendition of a judgment or an order overruling a motion for a new trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 386
(1978).
474. TEX. R. Civ. P. 385.
475. See note 455 supra and accompanying text.
476. TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(d).
477. Id; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 386. In addition, rule 385 now provides that the failure to
file the record timely in accelerated appeals may be excused if "reasonably explained." TEX.
R. Civ. P. 385(d). The rule previously excused such a failure only upon a showing of "good
cause." Tex. R. Civ. P. 385(b) (1978); see, e.g., Guaranty Bank v. Thompson, 595 S.W.2d
633, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
478. Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 389-389a (1978) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 389-389a. The clerk,
however, may still refuse to file a transcript not properly endorsed by the clerk of the lower
court or a statement of facts not authenticated by the reporter. See note 486 infra and ac-
companying text.
479. TEX. R. Civ. P. 387 now provides that the court, upon motion of the appellee or its
own motion, may dismiss the appeal or affirm the judgment for want of jurisdiction or fail-
ure to comply with the rules or any court order. Notice must be given to the appellant,
however, and he may file a response within 10 days showing "grounds for continuing the
appeal." Id
480. TEX. R. Civ. P. 386.
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an extension under rule 21c to avoid prejudice. 481
The procedures for procuring and filing the record were also changed by
the 1981 amendments. Rule 376,482 as amended, now places the burden on
the clerk of the trial court not only to prepare the transcript, but also to
transmit it to the appellate court. The appealing party must, however, des-
ignate the particular appellate court to receive it.483 In addition, the rule
added "the notice of limitation of appeal" to the list of documents to be
included in the transcript.484 Rule 377485 now permits the statement of
facts to be filed when certified by the official court reporter.486 Disagree-
ments as to the accuracy of the statement of facts may now be settled after
its filing by referring the dispute to the trial court for hearing.
48 7
The feasibility of appeals on partial statements of facts was significantly
enhanced by the addition of a provision to rule 377 stating that when a
partial statement is filed "there shall be a presumption on appeal that
nothing omitted from the record is relevant. . . to the disposition of the
appeal. '488 Accordingly, the provision of the rule permitting an appellee
to designate additional matters to be included in the statement489 takes on
added significance and imposes an additional duty on the appellee when
the appellant proposes a partial statement.490 An appellant requesting
such a partial statement, however, must file a statement of points to be
relied on and is thereafter limited to those points.491
Under amended rule 381492 bills of exception are required when perti-
nent matters are not included in the filed documents or in the record made
by the official reporter. Bills of exception must now be prepared and com-
pleted within sixty days after the judgment is signed, or when a timely
motion for a new trial has been made, within ninety days after the judg-
481. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c. See also notes 438-40 supra and accompanying text.
482. TEX. R. Civ. P. 376. Formerly, the appellant had the burden to transmit the tran-
script. See, e.g., Guaranty Bank v. Thompson, 595 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, writ dism'd) (negligent failure of clerk to file transcript chargeable to appellant).
483. TEX. R. Civ. P. 376.
484. Id See generally note 458 supra.
485. TEx. R. CIv. P. 377(e).
486. Tex. R. Civ. P. 377(d) (1978) required either agreement of the parties or court ap-
proval of the record.
487. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377(e).
488. TEX. R. CIv. P. 377(d). Under prior practice omitted material was presumed to
support the judgment. See, e.g., Dennis v. Hufse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. 1962).
489. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377(d). The appellant must not only notify the appellee of the
portions of the evidence requested to be included in the statement of facts, but, where a
partial statement is requested, must also include in the request a statement of the points to be
relied on. Id The appellee then has 10 days after the notice to designate additional por-
tions for inclusion. TEx. R. Civ. P. 377(c).
490. Because amended rule 377 retains the provision permitting monetary sanctions to be
imposed for requiring unnecessary testimony m the statement of facts, the appellee cannot
with impunity simply designate the entire testimony. TEX. R. Ov. P. 377(f). See also Tex.
R. Civ. P. 377(e) (1978).
491. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377(d).
492. TEX. R. COv. P. 381.
1981]
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
ment is signed.493 Such a bill may be included in the transcript or, upon a,
motion showing good cause, in a supplemental transcript.494
Once the record has been filed, rule 428495 authorizes supplementation
by amendment to include omitted material. In addition, a provision added
by the 1981 amendments requires the appellate court to allow the supple-
mentation if the omitted matter is material and the supplementation will
not unduly delay the disposition of the appeal. 496
In unaccelerated appeals, the times for filing the briefs of appellant and
appellee were not changed by the 1981 amendments. 497 In cases of accel-
erated appeals, 498 the appellant's brief must be filed within twenty days
after the record is filed; the appellee's brief must be filed within twenty
days thereafter.499 The rules, however, now permit the parties to gain ex-
tensions of the time for filing "[u]pon motion showing a reasonable expla-
nation" of the need for more time. 5°° Rule 418,501 governing the form of
briefs, further liberalizes appellate procedure by permitting combinations
of various related complaints into a single point of error so long as sepa-
rate record references are made to enable the court to understand the na-
ture of each complaint.502 The rule also increases the number of copies to
be filed from three to six.503
The 1981 amendments also modified the rule governing the procedure
for seeking a rehearing once the court of civil appeals has rendered its
judgment.5° Although the provisions governing original motions for re-
hearing are unchanged, rule 458505 now provides that a second motion for
rehearing is unnecessary when the appellate court modifies its judgment
with respect to any point that the court has already overruled. Thus, a
slight or partial modification of a judgment no longer requires a second
motion for rehearing to reassert all points stated in the original motion as a
prerequisite to further appeal. °6
In addition to the extensive changes made in the rules governing ap-
peals, the 1981 amendments also clarified and expanded the rules gov-
erning original proceedings in the courts of civil appeals and the supreme
493. Tex. R. Civ. P. 381 (1978) required such a filing within 50 days after the rendition of
a judgment or an order overruling a motion for a new trial.
494. TEX. R. Civ. P. 381.
495. TEX. R. Civ. P. 428.
496. Id Formerly, such supplementation was discretionary with the court. Tex. R. Civ.
P. 428 (1978).
497. TEX. R. Civ. P. 414 requires the appellant to file his brief within 30 days after the
record is filed, and the appellee to file within 25 days after the appellant's brief is filed.
498. See notes 453-55 supra and accompanying text.
499. TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(d).
500. TEX. R. Civ. P. 414; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 415. The former rules required a showing
of "good cause." Tex. R. Civ. P. 414-415 (1978).
501. TEX. R. Cv. P. 418.
502. TEX. R. Civ. P. 418(d).
503. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 414 with Tex. R. Civ. P. 414 (1978).
504. TEX. R. Civ. P. 458.
505. TEX. R. Civ. P. 458(b).
506. This was the case under the former rule. Tex. R. Civ. P. 458 (1978); see, e.g., Oil
Field Haulers Ass'n v. Railroad Comm'n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 189 (Tex. 1964).
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court. Prior to these amendments, two relatively brief and uninstructive
rules governed original proceedings. 50 7 The 1981 amendments extensively
revised these rules to provide guidance for original proceedings other than
habeas corpus50 8 and added two new rules governing habeus corpus pro-
ceedings.509
Rule 383510 now governs the procedures to be followed in the courts of
civil appeals in original proceedings other than habeas corpus. Such ac-
tions are instituted by filing with the court a motion for leave to file, a
petition, a brief,511 and a deposit for costs. 512 The petition must state the
grounds for the jurisdiction of the court,51 3 set forth all undisputed facts
necessary to establish the right to relief, contain certified or sworn copies of
the order complained of and other relevant exhibits, state the relief sought,
be verified, and contain a certificate of service. 5
14
Recognizing that while most mandamus actions are brought against a
judge, tribunal, or other official, they in fact affect the interests of another
party to an underlying proceeding, the rule requires such a party to be
named in the petition as a real party in interest. 515 Service must then be
made not only upon the actual respondent, but also upon the real party in
interest.516 The court may request a reply from the respondent or real
party in interest, and in that case, direct that the clerk of the court notify
all identified parties. 51 7 The parties may file an answer, opposing exhibits,
a verified statement of facts, and a brief within seven days after mailing the
notice of filing.5t 8
The court may, however, act upon the relator's motion without any prior
notice to other parties and without any reply to the motion if undue
prejudice or delay may result.519 If the court is of the tentative opinion
that the relief sought should be granted, the motion is granted, the petition
is filed, and the case is set on the docket.5 20 Moreover, the court is empow-
ered to grant temporary relief, effective until final disposition of the case,
507. Tex R. Civ. P. 383, 474 (1978).
508. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383, 474.
509. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383a, 475.
510. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383. Although mandamus is the most common of these proceed-
ings, others exist, including procedendo, certiorari, quo warranto, prohibition, and injunc-
tions to protect jurisdiction or enforce a judgment.
511. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(1)(a), (b). Three copies of each of these documents must be
filed. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(l)(b)(9).
512. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(l)(c); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 388a.
513. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(l)(b)(3). For a discussion of jurisdiction in such proceedings,
see Sales & Cliff, Jurisdiction in the Texas Supreme Court and Courts of Civil Appeals, 26
BAYLOR L. REV. 501 (1974).
514. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(l)(b)(4)-(8).
515. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(l)(b)(2). This includes any party whose interests would be "di-
rectly affected." Id
516. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(2).
517. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(3).
518. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(5).
519. TEX. R. Crv. P. 383(3).
520. Id If the court is not of such an opinion, the motion is overruled. Id
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in order to prevent prejudice to the relator. 52' Once the court grants the
motion, oral argument is scheduled and the respondent or real party in
interest may file a verified answer and brief.5 22
Rule 474523 sets forth a procedure for mandamus proceedings in the
supreme court, identical to appellate court proceedings, subject to several
exceptions. When the court of civil appeals shares concurrent jurisdiction,
the motion should first be presented to that court.5 24 Thus, rule 474 re-
quires that in such a case, the motion filed in the supreme court must state
the date the petition was presented to the court of civil appeals and that
court's action upon it, or supply a compelling reason for bypassing that
court.5 25 In addition, rule 483526 has been amended to include a provision
permitting the supreme court to expedite such proceedings when the action
of the respondent conflicts with a prior opinion of the supreme court or is
contrary to the Texas Constitution, statutes, or rules of civil procedure.5 27
In such cases, the supreme court may grant leave to file the petition, and
upon notice and opportunity to file a written reply by the respondents, may
grant the relator's writ without hearing oral argument.5 28
. Unlike other original proceedings, habeas corpus proceedings, under
new rules 383a 529 and 475530 do not require that a relator obtain the court's
permission to file the petition. Thus, no motion for leave to file is required,
and no interim argument is permitted.5 3' If the court is of the tentative
opinion that relief should be granted, it sets bond, orders that the relator
be released, and schedules oral argument.5 32 Notice is then given, the re-
spondents and interested parties are given an opportunity to file replies,
and oral argument is held.533 The habeas corpus procedure is similar to
other original proceedings in that when the court of civil appeals has con-
current jurisdiction with the supreme court the petition must be presented
first to the court of civil appeals.5 34
Given the recent increase in the use of motions to disqualify counsel for
521. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(4).
522. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(6).
523. TEX. R. Cv. P. 474.
524. TEX. R. Civ. P. 474(l)(a).
525. Id
526. TEX. R. Civ. P. 483.
527. Id
528. Id The supreme court has long had the power to reverse or alter a judgment of the
court of civil appeals without oral argument when such a conflict exists in cases brought to it
by writ of error. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 483 (1978). Until the 1981 amendments, however, it did
not have this power in mandamus actions.
529. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383a.
530. TEX. R. Civ. P. 475. With two exceptions, the habeas corpus procedure is essen-
tially the same as that for other original proceedings. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 383, 474 for a
discussion'of these proceedings. See notes 510-25 supra and accompanying text.
531. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383a, 475.
532. TEX. R. Civ, P. 383a(3), 475(4).
533. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383a(4)-(5), 475(5)-(6).
534. TEX. R. Civ. P. 475(3); see TEx. R. Civ. P. 474(l)(a) (in original proceedings other
than habeas corpus the motion should be presented to the court of civil appeals).
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a party,535 the opinion in Campbell v. Buech536 is important. In that case
the court held that an order disqualifying counsel is not an appealable
interlocutory order, despite the appellant's contention that the order's ex-
press prohibition against further participation in the case was "in the na-
ture of an injunction. '537 Thus, the court ruled that it was without
jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.538
XVII. RES JUDICATA
Southwestern Apparel, Inc. v. Bullock 539 discusses the application of the
doctrine of res judicata to a ruling rendered in a venue proceeding. The
plaintiff initially filed suit in Travis County against the state comptroller
and eleven utility companies who were not residents of the county. A
number of the defendants filed pleas of privilege, which were overruled by
the trial court.54 On appeal, the court of civil appeals reversed the deci-
sion of the trial court and ordered that the suits be transferred to the coun-
ties of the various defendants' residences. 541 Specifically, the court of civil
appeals held that the plaintiff had not proved a cause of action against the
comptroller. 542 Thereafter, the plaintiff dismissed the suit against the
eleven utility companies, leaving the comptroller as the sole defendant.
The trial court subsequently dismissed the suit against the comptroller, 54
3
and on an appeal from such action, the comptroller argued that the dismis-
sal was proper because the earlier appellate decision constituted a bar to
further action against him. Rejecting this argument because it presup-
posed that the decision in the earlier appeal was a final judgment disposing
of all issues and parties, the appellate court held that the previous ruling
on the plea of privilege was to be treated as final only insofar as it disposed
of venue issues.544
Aguilar v. Abraham545 indicates that mutuality of parties is not a re-
quirement for the application of collateral estoppel. The plaintiff in Agui-
lar, an attorney, had filed suit against another attorney regarding the
ownership of a case. After an adverse determination, the plaintiff filed a
second suit against the same attorney and two other members of his law
535. See generally Note, Motions to Disqualify Counsel Representing an Interest Adverse to
a Former Client, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 726 (1979).
536. No. 16410 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio Nov. 14, 1979) (unreported).
537. Id
538. Id
539. 598 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
540. Id at 703.
541. Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Southwestern Apparel, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 950, 954
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ dism'd).
542. Id at 953.
543. 598 S.W.2d at 703.
544. Id at 704; see Wichita Falls & S.R. v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 555, 558, 174 S.W.2d
951, 952-53 (1943).
545. No. 6815 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso Oct. 31, 1979) (unreported); see Benson v.
Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971); Olivarez v. Broadway Hardware,
Inc., 564 S.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Hardy
v. Fleming, 553 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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firm. Recognizing that the identical issue of ownership had previously
been determined against the plaintiff, the court of civil appeals affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the second suit based on the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel even though it involved two defendants who were not parties
to the first suit.5 46
XVIII. MISCELLANEOUS
Two supreme court decisions rendered during the survey period provide
guidance as to the procedure for remittitur.5 47 In Moore v. Grantham548
the supreme court reversed a judgment because the trial court had allowed
the introduction of inadmissible expert opinion testimony on the plaintiffs
loss of future earning capacity.5 49 On motion for rehearing, the plaintiff
offered to remit the portion of the judgment that awarded her a sum for
loss of future earning capacity and she requested that the judgment of the
trial court be reformed in order to eliminate that recovery. Granting the
plaintiffs request, the supreme court affirmed the remaining portion of the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and concluded that
"where the portion of a jury's verdict tainted with misconduct, or im-
properly arrived at, is capable of definite and accurate ascertainment,
and where the jury acted free from prejudice and passion, a remittitur
of the portion so tainted or improperly arrived at will cure the error,
and the part of the verdict free from the taint of misconduct and prop-
erly arrived at will be permitted to stand. '550
Another remittitur case, City National Bank v. Jacksboro National
Bank,551 involved an appeal from a suit to recover proceeds from the sale
of property securing a promissory note. After the plaintiff recovered a
judgment based on a favorable jury verdict, the defendant filed a motion
for a new trial and, alternatively, requested a remittitur. The trial court
granted the motion for new trial conditioned on the plaintiffs failure to
accept a remittitur.5 52 Thereafter, the plaintiff tendered a "remittitur
under protest" and appealed. The court of civil appeals found that the
order of remittitur was invalid and modified the trial court's judgment by
striking the remittitur.5 53 The supreme court, however, held that the ap-
peal should have been dismissed because the defendant, the party bene-
fited by the remittitur, did not appeal from the trial court's judgment.554
The supreme court relied on the language of rule 328,555 which expressly
546. No. 6815, slip op. at 3.
547. TEX. R. Civ. P. 315, 328, 439-441 govern remittitur procedure in district courts and
courts of civil appeals.
548. 599 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1980).
549. Id at 289-91.
550. Id at 292 (quoting Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Lightfoot, 139 Tex. 304, 309, 162
S.W.2d 929, 931 (1942)). See generall, Ogle v. Craig, 464 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. 1971).
551. 602 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam).
552. Id at 511.
553. 592 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979).
554. 602 S.W.2d at 512.
555. TEX. R. Civ. P. 328.
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provides: "whenever the court shall direct a remittitur in any action, ...
and the party for whose benefit it is made shall appeal in said action, then
the party remitting shall not be barred from contending in the appellate
court that said remittitur should not have been required ....
Article 2226,557 which authorizes the recovery of a reasonable attorneys'
fee in connection with the successful prosecution of certain types of claims,
was amended in 1977 to allow recovery of attorneys' fees in actions
"founded on oral or written contracts. '558 Brophy v. Brophy,5 59 Villiers v.
Republic Financial Services, Inc. ,560 and Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo
Lumber Co. 561 discuss the application of article 2226 to actions tried after
the effective date of the 1977 amendment. In Brophy the suit was on a
contract made in 1967. Finding that "[b]oth the breach of the contract and
the suit to recover the delinquent payments occurred after the effective
date of the [19771 amendment," the court held that article 2226 was appli-
cable and, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover attorneys'
fees for the successful prosecution of her action.562
In Villiers, another contract action, the defendant contended that attor-
neys' fees were not allowable because all of the transactions giving rise to
the suit occurred before the enactment of the 1977 amendment. Rejecting
the defendant's contention, the court of civil appeals held that attorneys'
fees were proper because the trial of the case had occurred after the effec-
tive date of the amendment.563 The court relied on the general rule that
"statutes dealing with a remedy, as distinguished from a right or cause of
action, are to be applied to actions tried after their passage even though the
right or cause of action arose prior thereto." 564
Finally, in Duval County Ranch Co. the defendant argued that attorneys'
fees were not proper in an action founded, in part, on a written contract
executed in 1972.565 The court concluded that because the trial of the ac-
tion occurred after the 1977 amendment, attorneys' fees were recover-
able.566 The court also rejected the defendant's claim that attorneys' fees
were not recoverable because an excessive demand had been made by the
plaintiff-creditor upon the defendant-debtor. 567 Recognizing the rule that
"when a creditor makes an excessive demand upon his debtor, he is not
entitled to attorneys' fees for subsequent litigation to recover the debt," the
556. Id; see 602 S.W.2d at 512.
557. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
558. Id
559. 599 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
560. 602 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
561. 597 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
562. 599 S.W.2d at 347.
563. 602 S.W.2d at 572.
564. Id The court also noted that in 1979 the Texas Legislature amended art. 2226 to
express the legislative intent that "[t]his Act is remedial in character and is intended to apply
to all pending and future actions, regardless of the time of institution thereof or of the ac-
crual of any cause of action asserted." Id
565. 597 S.W.2d at 530.
566. Id
567. Id at 531.
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court held that both a demand for more than is tendered and a refusal of
the tender must be made before the defense of excessive demand is appli-
cable.568
Phps v. Miller,569 a personal injury action, illustrates the utility of rule
174,570 which governs the use of separate trials. The trial court granted a
separate trial on the defendant's limitations defense.571 After an adverse
determination on the limitations point, the plaintiff appealed and argued
that the trial court had erred in holding a separate trial on the limitations
defense. Affirming the action of the trial court, the court of civil appeals
found that by trying the limitations question separately, "the time and ex-
pense of a full blown trial on the extent of the injury and the amount of
expenses incurred were avoided. ' 572 The court also noted that the trial
court's action was justified because the separate trial on limitations helped
"avoid prejudice" to the defendant by preventing reference to the existence
of insurance which, under the facts, was a critical element of the limita-
tions defense.5 73
In addition to the foregoing decisions, other miscellaneous develop-
ments occurred as a result of the 1981 amendments to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 12574 was modified to permit a challenge to the
authority of the plaintiffs attorney to prosecute the suit; the rule now sub-
jects all attorneys to a challenge that they are in court without authority.
Under new rule 14c 575 a party may, in lieu of a surety bond, deposit cash
or a negotiable obligation of the United States Government or, alterna-
tively, may upon leave of the court deposit a negotiable obligation of any
bank or savings and loan association chartered by the United States Gov-
ernment or any state government. Under rule 21576 a party filing a motion
is required to serve the motion upon the adverse party "not less than three
days before the time specified for the hearing, unless otherwise provided
by these rules or shortened by the court. ' 577 As a result of additions made
to rule 21 by the recent amendment, however, the three-day notice require-
ment is now applicable to all forms of requests for a court order. With
respect to an attorney's attendance at a legislative session as a ground for a
continuance, amended rule 254578 eliminates a conflict between it and arti-
cle 2168a, 579 which addresses the same subject. Rule 254 now authorizes
continuances based upon an attorney's attendance at a legislative session
568. Id at 531; see Collingsworth v. King, 155 Tex. 93, 98-99, 283 S.W.2d 30, 33 (1955);
Warrior Constructors, Inc. v. Small Business Inv. Co., 536 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
569. 597 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
570. TEX. R. Civ. P. 174.
571. 597 S.W.2d at 459.
572. Id at 460.
573. Id
574. TEX. R. Civ. P. 12.
575. TEX. R. Civ. P. 14c; see Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 487.
576. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21.
577. Id; see Pope & McConnico, supra note 1, at 487-88.
578. TEX. R. Civ. P. 254.
579. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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not only during the legislative session, but also within thirty days of the
session.580 Finally, rule 684,581 which requires a party seeking a temporary
restraining order or a temporary injunction to post a bond, was modified to
leave the amount of the bond entirely to the discretion of the trial court.
5 82
In 1978 the Texas Supreme Court amended the rules of civil procedure
governing attachment,5 83 garnishment,584 and sequestration5 85 in an effort
to bring those rules into compliance with federal due process standards.
The rules of civil procedure related to distress warrants 586 and trials of
right of property 587 were amended in 1981 in order to achieve a similar
result with respect to those procedures.
580. TEX. R. Civ. P. 254; see Pope & McConnico, supra note I, at 488.
581. TEX. R. Civ. P. 684.
582. Formerly, the rule provided that "[i]f the injunction be applied for to restrain the
execution of a money judgment or the collection of a debt, the bond shall be fixed in the
amount of such judgment or debt, plus a reasonable amount to cover interest and costs."
Tex. R. Civ. P. 684 (1978).
583. TEX. R. CIv. P. 592-609.
584. TEx. R. Civ. P. 657-679.
585. TEX. R. CIv. P. 696-716.
586. TEX. R. Civ. P. 610-614a. TEX. R. Civ. P. 615-620, which also relate to distress
warrants, were left unchanged.
587. TEX. R. Civ. P. 717-734.
1981]

